Substantive Law Of The Place Of Original Injury Governs In Products Liability Case
ROBINSON v. MCNEIL CONSUMER HEALTHCARE (August 11, 2010)
In early 2005, Karen Robinson purchased Children's Motrin for her child. Motrin is manufactured by McNeil Consumer Healthcare. The label, which she read before purchase, warned of a possible severe allergic reaction. Several months later, she took a dose of the Motrin for a headache. She neither reread nor recalled the warnings. The next day, Robinson developed a rash and a fever – so she took more Motrin. A doctor’s visit resulted in treatment for an allergic reaction. The doctor did not comment on her disclosure that she had taken Motrin. Her rash and fever worsened and she took a third dose of the Motrin. She was hospitalized the next day and diagnosed with toxic epidermal necrolysis (TEN). She recovered but lost much of her skin, is blind in one eye and expected to lose sight in the other, and has had multiple operations to treat organ damage. She brought a products liability suit against McNeil. The jury awarded damages of $3.5 million but also found Robinson contributorily negligent. Applying Virginia law, where contributory negligence is a complete defense to a negligence claim, Judge Holderman (N.D. Ill.) entered judgment for McNeil. Robinson appeals.
In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Kanne affirmed. The Court first addressed the district court's application of Virginia law. Illinois' conflict rule is the "most significant relationship" test. In the case of a tort, that test points to the location of the injury. Here, the place of the initial injury was Virginia, although the Robinsons have since moved to Illinois where her condition worsens and her injury continues. The Court rejected a "continuation of the injury" location test. That approach would allow potential plaintiffs to relocate to favorable jurisdictions after an initial injury. Since the law was correctly applied and there was evidence of contributory negligence, the court ruled correctly. The Court then embarked on a lengthy and interesting, albeit unnecessary, analysis applying Illinois law to show that the result would be the same. In Illinois, a plaintiff's contributory negligence is only a complete defense if it exceeds the negligence of the defendant. The Court adopted a test under which the party who could have avoided the accident at a "lower cost" was the least negligent. After a discussion of the benefits of Motrin, the evidence of any causal connection between Motrin and TEN, the effect of requiring a prescription for Motrin, the role of the FDA, the warnings, and the effect of additional warnings, the Court concluded that Robinson had the lower cost of avoidance. The outcome would have therefore been the same. Finally, the Court concluded that a) the defendant's statement in closing argument that it was "not blaming" Robinson for her injuries was not so deliberate and unambiguous so as to amount to a judicial admission that she was not contributorily negligent, and b) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinson's request to reinstate her breach of warranty claim right before trial.
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Jay Hayden died in 1985. His will established the Jay E. Hayden Foundation and named Robert Cochonour as executor. Between 1985 and 2001, Cochonour allegedly embezzled from both the Foundation and from accounts belonging to Hayden's mother and his mother’s friend. Cochonour apparently had the cooperation of First Neighbor Bank in carrying out his misdeeds. By 2002, Cochonour admitted that he had stolen some money and had resigned his state court judgeship. The trustees of the Foundation were aware that it no longer had any assets but there was no record of what happened. For several years, Cochonour and the bank took steps to prevent the plaintiffs from learning additional facts. Eventually, in May of 2008, plaintiffs brought a RICO action against the bank, two law firms, and several associated individuals. Judge Reagan (S.D. Ill.) granted defendants' motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. Plaintiffs appeal.
Kathy Lantz was married to a dentist with whom she filed joint federal tax returns. Unfortunately, she was also married to a dentist who was convicted of Medicare fraud and who the IRS accused of understating their joint tax liability. When she received a notice of tax levy and information from the IRS regarding innocent spouse relief, she allowed her then estranged husband to respond. Although he requested a due process hearing and application for such relief, he died before taking any other action. In 2006, the tax obligation exceeded $1 million. The IRS applied Lantz’ 2005 income tax refund of $3200 to her tax liability. Unemployed and poor, she applied for innocent spouse relief. The IRS rejected her application because she had failed to apply within two years from the notice of intent to levy. The Tax Court invalidated the two-year deadline. The Commissioner appeals..jpg)
The 
South Beach Securities, Inc. is controlled by Leon Greenblatt and was once a registered securities dealer. In the early 2000s, Greenblatt orchestrated a number of financial transactions among South Beach and other companies, including Scattered Corporation, which he controlled in whole or in part. At the time, South Beach's only potential assets were net operating losses. As a result of the transactions, Scattered became South Beach's only creditor. South Beach filed a Chapter 11 petition and submitted a plan of reorganization. The U.S. Trustee opposed confirmation of the plan. The bankruptcy court refused confirmation and dismissed the petition. Judge Lefkow (N.D. Ill.) affirmed. Scattered and South Beach appeal.
Federal officers executed a search warrant at a company owned by James Stuart. Stuart filed a pro se motion seeking the return of property seized during the execution of the warrant. The matter was assigned to the magistrate judge who issued the warrant. The judge denied the motion, which he had treated as a Rule 41(g) motion for the return of property. A few months later, Stuart filed a second pleading naming only the agent who had applied for the warrant. In that pleading, Stuart sought damages for what he alleged was the unconstitutional seizure of chemical formulas worth millions of dollars. The district court denied the request on the ground that it was the equivalent of the earlier pleading. Stuart appeals..jpg)
Michelle Bailey was employed by the defendant Pregis Innovative Packaging -- that is, until they terminated her for accumulating too many absenteeism points during a 12-month period. She brought suit against Pregis under the Family and Medical Leave Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Pregis. Bailey appeals.
Lance Wrightsell is a former prisoner of the Cook County Jail. He brought an action against the County pursuant to § 1983. He alleged that the County's practice of making only one dentist available to the 10,000 inmates of the jail constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. After the district court denied his request for class certification, he agreed to an offer of judgment of $10,000 and renounced his right to appeal. John Smentek, another former inmate, also had a class action pending in the district court -- against the same defendant, alleging the same constitutional violation, and represented by the same attorney. Wrightsell, notwithstanding his renunciation, appeals the district court's denial of class certification. Smentek petitions for leave to intervene in the appeal.
Al's Service Center was a gasoline service station and a franchisee of 
A number of residents of Taiwan brought suit against manufacturers of clotting factors. They allege that the defendants improperly processed donated blood in California and continued to sell it in foreign countries after they knew it was contaminated. The plaintiffs are mainly hemophiliacs who were infected with HIV from the contaminated clotting factors. The plaintiffs also allege that the defendants fraudulently induced a settlement agreement and they allege a breach of the settlement agreement. The district court dismissed the claims, some on the merits as untimely and others pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The plaintiffs appeal..jpg)
Wavie Luster lived alone in her home in 
Plaza Associates is a well-known debt collection agency. It sent two collection letters to DeKoven stating that it had the authority to offer a lump-sum settlement but that the offer would only be "valid for a period of thirty-five (35) days." In a different letter to a plaintiff in a related suit, Plaza Associates included the DeKoven statement and also stated that a recipient who disputed the validity of the debt with "satisfactory proof" should provide that information to Plaza. The plaintiffs filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. They complained about the "35 day" language and the "satisfactory proof" language. The former, they complain, might be construed by some as a final offer -- when in fact it is not. The latter, they complain, might be construed by some that a recipient must have "proof" to dispute the validity of the debt. Both plaintiffs retained the same survey expert. The expert conducted a survey but the judges in both cases considered it inadmissible. In both cases, the court below entered summary judgment for Plaza Associates. In both cases, the plaintiff appeals.
Aubrey Howard purchased a $30,000 car. He made a down payment of $4,500 and traded in his old car. Although his old car was worth $14,500, he still owed $22,500. He therefore financed $35,500 (the purchase price minus the down payment plus the $8,000 in negative equity plus $2,000 in taxes and fees). Later (within 910 days), he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. An issue presented to the bankruptcy court was whether the $8,000 in negative equity was subject to the court's cramdown power. The bankruptcy court ruled that negative equity is included in a purchase money security interest and is therefore not subject to the court's cramdown power. Howard appeals..jpg)
The 
Stephen Thorogood filed a state court class-action on behalf of the purchasers of stainless steel dryers in multiple states. He alleged that the defendant’s representation that the dryers were made of stainless steel violated the consumer protection acts of those states. The defendant removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Although the district court certified a class, the Seventh Circuit 
Midwest Title Loans is a "title lender." Title loans are high-cost, high-risk loans. Car owners, generally from the lower income segment of the population, pay triple digit interest rates to borrow against their car titles. Midwest is located in Illinois but loaned to Indiana residents. All the loans were made in-person in Illinois. Midwest did advertise in Indiana and, when necessary, executed repossessions in Indiana. The State of Indiana considered Midwest's practices predatory. In 2007, it amended its Uniform Consumer Credit Code to provide the a loan is deemed to occur in Indiana if an Indiana resident enters into such loan with an out-of-state company that advertised or solicited in Indiana. Once a loan is deemed to occur in Indiana, the lender is subject to the provisions of the code, including interest rate caps and license requirements. Indiana advised Midwest of this amendment in August of 2007. Midwest was not licensed in Indiana and its products exceeded the interest rate cap. Midwest brought suit under §1983, alleging that the amendment violated the commerce clause. The district court permanently enjoined application of the amendment. Indiana appeals.
Cunningham Charter Corp. brought a breach of warranty and products liability class action against Learjet in state court. Learjet removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After the district court denied class certification for failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, it remanded the case to state court. The district court concluded that the denial of certification deprived the court of federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Learjet sought leave to appeal.
Rex Carr was a lawyer in southern Illinois. He and his partners had several agreements concerning the allocation of fees earned by the firm. The agreements continued in effect after the dissolution of the firm in 2003. Significant disputes arose, and a host of lawsuits were filed, with respect to those fees. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was agreed to in 2004. It was meant to control the distribution of all fees, past and future, among the partners. Notwithstanding an agreement to dismiss all pending cases, Carr actually amended a counterclaim in one of the pending actions to assert that he had been fraudulently induced to enter into the MOU. The claim was eventually dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed. While the appeal was pending, Carr brought four separate suits in state court, then brought this federal case, and then voluntarily dismissed the state cases. He brought the federal case under RICO, repeating many of the allegations of the earlier suits, including the fraudulent inducement claim. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. Carr appeals. The defendants cross-appeal from the court's denial of their motion for sanctions..jpg)
In Chicago, the World Outreach Conference Center ("WOCC") operates a community center. It is a Christian organization, one of whose goals is to assist and provide relief to the needy and suffering. WOCC purchased the center in 2005 from the YMCA. Although the land was rezoned several years ago, YMCA's operations were a legal nonconforming use. WOCC wants to operate the building by renting out its many apartments – just as the YMCA did. The Center did need a single-room-occupancy (SRO) license to operate. Apparently because an alderman had wanted a financial backer to acquire the property, the City refused to grant the license. WOCC brought suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), challenging the City's refusal to grant the license. Although the City eventually did grant the license, the suit continued with its claim for damages. The court dismissed the complaint. WOCC appeals.
Anodyne Therapy 
Ahmad Milam is one of several African-American produce clerks at a Chicago 
Calumet City passed an ordinance that requires a homeowner to conduct an inspection prior to the sale of the house to ensure its compliance with the building code. Several residents of the city brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The residents appeal.
Crown Unlimited Machine, Inc. ("Crown"), which designed and built custom machinery, was owned by the Stroup family. In 1999, the Stroups sold the company to Kevin Smith for $6 million. The $6 million consisted of $3.1 million that Smith borrowed, a $2.9 million note and only $500 directly from Smith. The Stroups split almost $600,000 in cash withdrawn from the company pre-closing as well as the $3.1 million in cash received at closing. Within about three years, the new Crown declared bankruptcy. The assets brought out $3.7 million. Most of the money was used to pay off the secured debt -- little was left to address over $1.5 million in unsecured debt. The Trustee in bankruptcy brought an action against the Stroups and the company, alleging a fraudulent conveyance. The bankruptcy court awarded over $3 million to the trustee. The district court affirmed. The Stroups appeal -- the Trustee cross-appeals, seeking the $600,000 pre-closing distribution..jpg)
Stephen Bandak was employed by an Eli Lilly company in England, his native country, from 1978 to 1995. He participated in the company's retirement plan. He was transferred to the United States in 1995. The company told him, upon his enrollment in the U. S. company's plan, that his benefits in that plan would be based on years of employment retroactive to 1978. The plan also provided that benefits would be reduced by the actuarial equivalence of any other benefits under a “qualified defined benefit plan” maintained by an Eli Lilly company. When Bandak retired in 2004, the company took the position that his benefits under the English company's plan were benefits under a qualified defined benefit plan and were thus properly deducted from his U.S. pension benefits. Bandak sued the company under ERISA. Judgment was entered in his favor for both damages and an injunction relating to future benefit payments. The court also concluded that Lilly's position was not substantially justified and awarded attorneys’ fees. Eli Lilly appeals.
Schering-Plough makes an over-the-counter oral laxative which it sells under the trade name "MiraLAX." Its chemical name is polyethylene glycol 3350. Four other companies sell polyethylene glycol 3350 as a generic, prescription medication. The FDA requires a warning on the over-the-counter version that it should not be used for more than seven days. The FDA also requires that a generic drug be labeled the same as the original drug and be bioequivalent to the original drug. Schering-Plough brought a Lanham Act action against the defendants. It alleges that the defendants' labels stating that the drug is sold by prescription only are false, in violation of the Act. Meanwhile, the FDA is conducting proceedings to determine whether the defendants' products are mislabeled. The district court dismissed Schering-Plough's suit without prejudice, noting that it could be refiled, if appropriate, after the conclusion of the FDA proceedings. Schering-Plough appeals. The defendants cross appeal, seeking a dismissal with prejudice.
James River
Alberto-Culver is a significant domestic producer of hair and skin-care products. In 1980, it transferred Japanese trademark registrations to Sunstar, a Japanese manufacturer of similar products. The deal required Sunstar to transfer the trademarks to Bank One Corporation in trust for 99 years. Bank One, in turn, licensed them back to Sunstar and was obligated to return the marks to Sunstar after the term of years. As trustee, Bank One could stop the use of the mark if it had reasonable grounds to think that Sunstar committed an act that created a danger to the value or validity of the marks. Alberto-Culver and Sunstar referred to the rights granted as a senyoshiyoken, the Japanese legal term describing a license under which the licensee has the exclusive right to use the marks in its geographic area and can sue infringers in its own name. Sunstar paid $10 million for the license. In 1989, Sunstar asked for permission to use a variant of one of the marks. Alberto-Culver refused. Sunstar ended up paying another $10 million for the rights to use the variant. In 1999, Sunstar again asked for permission to use a variation of one of the marks. This time, when Alberto-Culver refused, Sunstar filed suit. The suit sought a declaration that the requested variation was permitted by the license agreement. At trial, the district court refused to instruct the jury on the legal meaning of the term senyoshiyoken, concluding that it was irrelevant. The jury returned a verdict for Alberto-Culver but awarded no damages. The judge enjoined Sunstar from using the variation of the mark, terminated the agreement as a result of Sunstar's breach and ordered the marks returned to Alberto-Culver. Sunstar appeals..jpg)
Kamelgard and Macura are both 
Illinois Beach State Park is located in northeastern Illinois on the shores of Lake Michigan. Various buildings in the park have display racks containing pamphlets on various topics. The Illinois Dunesland Preservation Society is a nonprofit corporation that supports the park. The Society created a pamphlet warning of the risk of asbestos at the park's beaches. When the park refused to display the pamphlet, the Society brought suit under § 1983 against the state officials involved in operating the park. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials. The Society appeals.
Deborah Cooney and her husband were divorced in 1998. The court granted her custody of their two sons. Her ex-husband later petitioned for a transfer of custody. The court appointed a lawyer to act as the children's representative. Cooney alleges that the representative arranged to have a psychiatrist appointed and then suggested to the psychiatrist that she suffered a particular mental illness. The psychiatrist's report did conclude that she suffered from the mental illness. Cooney alleges that her ex-husband received a copy of that report but that she did not. Based on the report, the court granted temporary custody to the ex-husband. She brought suit against the judge, the representative, the psychiatrist, the children's therapist and the ex-husband's lawyer. The court dismissed her complaint. Cooney appeals.
Jose Aguirre was employed as a bricklayer by one of the subcontractors involved in the renovation of Chicago's Soldier Field. He was seriously injured when he fell off a scaffold. He brought this personal injury suit against the joint venture that was acting as general contractor for the project. The court first found that the general contractor had no duty to Aguirre and that Aguirre could not avail himself of res ipsa loquitur, in that the general contractor did not have exclusive control of the scaffold. It granted summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed on both grounds, concluding that the defendants assumed a duty and that exclusive control is not an element of res ipsa loquitur. On remand, the case was tried to a defense verdict. Aguirre appeals.
A lawyer for the city of Peoria sought and obtained a warrant for the arrest of Joshua Thomas. Joshua’s crime -- nine unpaid parking tickets. Sometime later, Joseph Thomas was stopped for a traffic violation. Although the names and addresses of Joshua and Joseph did not match, the driver's license number on the arrest warrant for Joshua did match that of Joseph. Joseph was arrested. He was later released when it was determined that he was, indeed, not Joshua. Joseph brought an action under § 1983 against the City and the lawyer who obtained the warrant. He alleged a deprivation of his Fourth Amendment and due process rights. The court dismissed for failure to state a claim. He then denied class certification. Thomas appeals..jpg)
The Chicago Teachers Union fired Earl Prince from his job. Prince filed an administrative discrimination charge. He then brought an action pro se for employment discrimination under Title VII before he received any response from the Illinois Department of Human Rights or the EEOC. The district court dismissed the complaint because Prince had not yet received a right-to-sue letter. Several months later, after Prince had received the letter, the district court granted his motion to reopen the case. The court vacated the order, however, a few days later at Prince's request. Months later, on the last day to sue, Prince again moved to reopen the case. This time, the judge turned him down -- and it was too late to file a new complaint. Prince appeals.
Years ago, a corporate predecessor of Apex Oil Co. owned a refinery near Hartford, Illinois. According to the EPA, the operation of the refinery contributed to the contamination of the groundwater in the area. The United States brought an action, pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), for an injunction to require Apex to clean up the site. Apex argued that its earlier discharge in bankruptcy relieved it of any cleanup obligation. The district court issued the injunction. Apex appeals.
A Wisconsin statute prohibits a gasoline retailer from selling its product below cost plus a defined markup. The statute contains both state and private remedies of both an injunctive and damages nature. Flying J is such a gasoline retailer. It sued the state, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute on the grounds that it was preempted by the Sherman Act. The district court granted the injunction. During the time period for taking an appeal, the state decided not to appeal. An association of gasoline retailers asked the district court for leave to intervene both as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) and as permissive under Rule 24(b)(1)(B). The court denied the intervention on the grounds that it was untimely and that the association's members lacked the requisite interest. The association appeals.
Years ago, Michael Marrs developed a psychiatric condition that forced him to leave his job at Motorola and go on disability leave. Six years after he started his leave, Motorola amended its disability plan. It imposed a two-year limit on disability benefits resulting from mental, rather than physical, conditions. Marr's benefits were terminated by Motorola two years after the amendment. Marrs brought a class action under ERISA. The district court granted summary judgment to Motorola. Marrs appeals.
Jack Smith sold his company and its intellectual property to Dade Behring, Inc. He received, as part of the consideration, options to purchase 20,000 shares of Dade Behring stock. He soon left the employ of the company. He agreed to accept $1.4 million in cash, while retaining his options. A few months later, the company entered bankruptcy. Smith's options were extinguished as part of its reorganization. Smith sued several officers of the company, alleging that they had a duty to disclose at the time of this termination agreement the fact that the company would soon enter bankruptcy. The district court dismissed his fraud claim for failure to state a cause of action. Smith appeals.
Gabbenelli Accordions & Imports ("American Gabbenelli") used to be the American distributor for a predecessor of defendant Ditta Gabbenelli Ubaldo Di Elio Gabbenelli ("Italian Gabbenelli"). Disputes arose between the two companies in the 1990s. In 1999, the two companies entered into an agreement under which American Gabbenelli retained the exclusive right to use the Gabbenelli mark in North America and Italian Gabbenelli retained the exclusive right to use it in Italy. The parties further agreed that future disputes would be resolved by arbitration. Notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, Italian Gabbenelli sued American Gabbenelli in an Italian court and American Gabbenelli filed this suit in the United States. American Gabbenelli charged Italian Gabbenelli with trademark infringement. The district court first rejected Italian Gabbenelli's contention that the arbitration agreement deprived the court of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the Italian litigation. When no decision was rendered within a few years, the court lifted the stay. American Gabbenelli served Italian Gabbenelli with requests for admissions in May of 2005. Italian Gabbenelli finally appeared through counsel in October of 2005 but did not respond to the requests for admissions. Italian Gabbenelli filed an opposition to American Gabbenelli's motion for summary judgment in June of 2007, and also asked for leave to deny the requests for admissions, which had since been deemed admitted. The court denied that request and granted American Gabbenelli's motion for summary judgment. Italian Gabbenelli appeals.
Joel Turner had monthly mortgage payments of $1500 when he filed a Chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy. In computing his "projected disposable income" under the bankruptcy law, he deducted the mortgage payments. He stated in his plan, however, that he intended to stop making his mortgage payments and turn his home over to the mortgagee. The trustee objected. The $1500 monthly deduction from Turner’s disposable income would make that much unavailable to the unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy court rejected the trustee’s objection. The trustee appealed under a since superseded process for direct appeal to the court of appeals. The process required: a) the trustee to file a notice of appeal in the bankruptcy court within 30 days, b) the bankruptcy court to certify that the ruling satisfied certain statutory criteria, and c) the trustee had to petition the court of appeals for leave to appeal within 10 days of the certification. The trustee filed his notice of appeal and the court certified. The trustee never filed a petition -- but the clerk of the court transmitted the request for certification and the certification order. The Court docketed the appeal..jpg)
The State of Wisconsin hosts two law schools, at 
A number of investors sold 10-year U.S. Treasury notes short and, between May 9 and June 30, 2005, bought futures contracts in settlement of their obligations. These investors brought a class action against Pacific Investment Management Co. (PIMCO), alleging that PIMCO violated the Commodity Exchange Act by cornering the market in certain Treasury notes. The class alleges that PIMCO increased its ownership of the notes to the point where it created a monopoly price, resulting in losses to the class of more than $600 million. PIMCO challenged the class definition. It pointed out that many class members did not lose money because of the net effects of multiple trades. The district court certified the class. PIMCO appeals.
The Cunninghams owned a building in Martinsville, Indiana in which they operated a photographic studio from 1986 until 2004. The building next door contained a dry cleaning establishment. Soon after the Cunninghams made the building their residence, they both began to experience headaches and other physical maladies. They moved out as soon as the EPA advised them that high levels of .jpg)
The plaintiffs, Bonnie and Connie Roth, were insurance agents. Each had an agency agreement with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. The agreement provided that it could be terminated for "undesirable performance" only with six months notice and an opportunity to correct. It also provided that it could be terminated without notice if an agent engaged in "dishonest, disloyal or unlawful" conduct. One of the agents signed an applicant's name on a insurance policy application at the applicant’s request. The other signed the name of a different agent on a policy certification, also with authorization. American Family terminated their agency agreements. The Roths brought suit for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to American Family. The Roths appeal.
William Fletcher was injured while driving a utility vehicle in a rail yard. He sued Chicago Rail Link under the Federal Employers Liability Act. He alleged that the accident was caused by the railroad's failure to maintain the vehicle in a safe condition. A jury awarded him $700,000 in damages but also found that he was 50% negligent himself. Under FELA, such a finding would reduce the damages by one half unless the court finds that the employer violated "any statute enacted for the safety of employees" and that the violation contributed to the accident. The district court found that Chicago Rail Link had violated an Illinois Commerce Commission regulation and awarded full damages. Chicago Rail Link appeals.
In one case, several hundred Argentine hemophiliacs brought a class action against Bayer Corporation and others, alleging that they were infected with AIDS as a result of the defendants’ negligence. In another case, Argentina plaintiffs brought suit against U.S. companies arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiffs allege that defendants were negligent in the design and manufacture of the vehicle and its tires. Both cases were filed in federal district courts against American defendants by foreign plaintiffs for injuries sustained in Argentina. After significant discovery, the judge in each case dismissed the case based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The plaintiffs appealed.
Two private planes collided while approaching a small airport. The three people aboard all died. Air traffic control at the small airport was under the control of Midwest Air Traffic Control Services, a company hired by the Federal Aviation Administration. The representatives of the deceased brought an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. They allege both that the air traffic controller was negligent in clearing both planes to land and that the FAA was negligent because it had not installed a radar system at the small airport. The district court entered judgment for the United States after a bench trial. The representatives appeal..jpg)
Suit was filed in state court against a defendant class of companies. The defendant class consisted of H&R Block Tax Services, Inc. ("TSI") and its affiliates or franchisees. The suit, brought on behalf of a plaintiff class, alleged violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The state court certified the defendant class and originally three plaintiff classes, including people in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. On TSI's motion, the court decertified the defendant class but refused to decertify the plaintiff class, although it did narrow it to residents of only 13 states. TSI removed the case pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), on the theory that the decertification of the defendant class occurred after CAFA’s effective date and increased TSI’s potential liability. The district court remanded the case to state court. TSI requested leave to appeal, which the Court granted.
Rick Madden, a member of the U.S. Air Force Reserve, was hired as a temporary employee at Rolls-Royce Corporation. He represented, falsely, that he was a graduate of Purdue's engineering program. He did not impress his supervisor with his skills. At the end of the temporary period for which she had been hired, Rolls-Royce let him go. He then applied for a job with Data Systems and Solutions (DS&S), without success. Madden brought suit against Rolls-Royce and DS&S, alleging that both violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) by discriminating against him on the basis of his military service. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Madden appeals.
Construction and Design Co. (CDC), a small construction company with three employees, is organized as a Subchapter S Corporation. As such, its income is taxed directly to its shareholders. CDC petitioned to obtain a visa to add a Ukrainian carpenter to its staff. The Department of Homeland Security denied the petition, ruling that CDC could not afford the proposed $50,000 salary for the carpenter. The district court affirmed. CDC and the alien appeal.
The 
Federal agents seized thousands of cans of powdered baby formula from a warehouse. They suspected that the cans had been stolen from retail stores. Many of the cans had altered labels - some of the cans were even past their 
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Joanne Teal had been employed by the U. S. Postal Service for almost 20 years when, during an altercation, she struck her supervisor's hand. Although the Postal Service attempted to discharge her, a grievance arbitrator determined that she should be suspended instead. Before she could be reinstated, however, Teal had to demonstrate her physical and mental fitness to resume her duties. For over eight months, the Postal Service went to great lengths to accommodate Teal's needs in scheduling the examinations. Finally, in July of 2003, the Postal Service advised Teal that they were terminating her employment. In the meantime, Teal filed an EEOC complaint in January of 2003, complaining that the original termination of her employment was discriminatory. Teal sued the Postal Service pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. The district court concluded that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and granted summary judgment to the Postal Service..jpg)
Charlotte Muha, representing a class of credit card debtors, brought an action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") against Encore Receivable Management, Inc. The complaint alleged that Encore violated the FDCPA by stating, in a debt collection letter, that "your original agreement with the above mentioned creditor has been revoked." Plaintiffs allege that that statement is false. The plaintiffs also claim that the statement is misleading and confusing and sought to introduce a survey to support that allegation. The lower court excluded the survey and granted summary judgment to Encore. Plaintiffs appeal.
Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPCO) and the Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) entered into a contract for the transportation of coal from Colorado coal mines to WEPCO during the years 1999 -- 2005. The rate that UP could charge WEPCO depended on whether UP was able to reload its empty railcars with shipments of iron ore destined for a steel mill in Utah. The contract provided that UP could charge the higher rate if "an event of force majeure" prevented it from reloading its rail cars with iron ore. The steel mill was bankrupt when the parties entered into the agreement, though still operating. It shut down in 2001, but did not close for good until 2004. UP declared an "event of force majeure" after the mill’s final closure in 2004. WEPCO sued UP for breach of contract, alleging that it was not liable for the higher rate under the contract and that UP failed to perform its contractual obligation to ship requested tonnage to WEPCO. The District Court granted summary judgment to UP. WEPCO appeals
Kevin Schmude, a 350-pound man, was working on a construction project. He climbed an 8-foot ladder manufactured by Tricam Industries, Inc. (Tricam) to in order to inspect electrical connections in the space above a ceiling. He and the ladder collapsed onto the floor. One of the rivets designed to secure the rear leg was found on the floor. The leg itself had separated from the ladder. A jury found for Schmude and awarded $677,000 in damages. Tricam appeals.
Twenty-two years and $3 million in legal fees and this dispute continues. Samuel Hardige and Kenneth Nelson settled a dispute in the early 1980s. Hardige gave some property to Nashville Residence Corporation (“NRC”), a company belonging to Nelson, in exchange for a promissory note secured by the property and payable to Orlando Residence, Ltd. (“OR”). NRC failed to pay the note when due. OR sued NRC on the note and obtained a judgment. But NRC had already conveyed the property to Nashville Lodging Company (“NLC”), which in turn conveyed it to Metric Partners. In 1992, OR sued Nelson and several companies controlled by him, including NRC, in Tennessee state court. Fourteen years, three trials, three appeals, and two remands later, OR had final judgments against Nelson and his companies. Meanwhile, OR purchased the subject property at a judicial sale for $100,000 – which amount was deducted from his judgment. On another track, GP Credit bought NLC’s personal property at a foreclosure sale. The personal property included a lawsuit against Metric Partners. Although OR tried to reach the proceeds of that lawsuit, GP Credit prevailed in an action to clear its title (which was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit). After GP Credit cleared its title, OR obtained a default judgment against GP Credit on the theory that it was the alter ego of Nelson.
Brascan Asset Management (“Brascan”) owned 41% of the common stock of Noranda, Inc. (“Noranda”). Noranda owned, in turn, 59% of Falconbridge, Inc. (“Falconbridge”). Noranda and Falconbridge were both large Canadian mining companies. In March 2005, Noranda offered the minority shareholders in Falconbridge 1.77 shares of Noranda stock for each share of Falconbridge. The offer was conditioned on being accepted by holders of more than half of Falconbridge’s shares. The plaintiffs (two hedge funds) bought Falconbridge shares in the months leading up to the tender-offer expiration date in May. The plaintiffs believed that Falconbridge was grossly undervalued. Before the expiration of the tender-offer, the plaintiffs learned of many problems in the transaction. They expressed their concerns to the Canadian regulators. They exposed a conflict of interest at the investment bank that did the valuation of Falconbridge and in the internal Falconbridge committee that considered the valuation. They also warned that Noranda overstated the value of its own shares. The plaintiffs tendered their shares and the tender-offer succeeded. A few months later, Noranda and Falconbridge merged. Shortly thereafter, another mining company offered to buy the merged company for a price substantially above the tender-offer price. The plaintiffs brought this action against both the merged company and Brascan. The suit was based on the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 and section 11 of the Securities Exchange Act. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs appeal.
MIRFASIHI v. FLEET MORTGAGE (December 30, 2008)
Illinois Bell (“Bell”) alleged that Global NAPs Illinois (“GNI”) violated Bell’s federal tariffs, its state tariffs, and the interconnection agreement between them. Bell named as defendants GNI, its parent Ferrous Miner Holdings (“FMH”), and four other affiliated companies. The district court found it did not have personal jurisdiction over FMH and that Bell’s evidence of a “piercing the corporate veil” theory was not sufficient to confer that jurisdiction. The court dismissed FMH and entered a Rule 54(b) final judgment. Bell appeals..jpg)
David Boim was a Jewish teenager living in Israel. He had dual Israeli/American citizenship. In 1996, he was killed by gunfire near Jerusalem. Boim’s parents brought suit under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). They alleged that defendants Muhammad Salah, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (“HLF”), the American Muslim Society (“AMS”) and the Quranic Literacy Institute (“QLI”) all provided financial support to Hamas and that their son had been killed by Hamas gunmen. The district court rejected the argument that financial assistance was not international terrorism under § 2333(a) in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss. On an interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court granted summary judgment on liability to plaintiffs with respect to Salah, HLF and AMS. A jury found QLI liable and assessed damages against all defendants of $52 million before trebling. On appeal, a Seventh Circuit panel vacated and remanded to redetermine liability. The plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing en banc, which was granted.
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William Atkins was a passenger in a car driven by his brother Adam in October, 2003. A Chicago police officer stopped the car and arrested William on a parole violation warrant with his name. William professed his innocence. He continued to insist he was the “wrong man” but never asked to see a lawyer or took any legal action. He was released – thirty seven days later. He brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the arresting officers and prison guards, among others. He alleged that his arrest was unlawful, that he was mistreated in prison, and that the Department of Corrections lacked procedures for identifying cases of mistaken identity. Adam joined in the suit as far as it complained of the arrest. Both Atkins brothers were represented by the same lawyer. In December of 2006, the lawyer filed a document captioned a “Motion to Substitute” that alerted the court to the untimely death of William. The lawyer stated that he was going to open an estate so that William’s wife Brandie could continue the lawsuit. The district court denied the motion. There was no one yet with proper status to substitute. After 90 days, the defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that no substitution had been made within 90 days of a “suggestion of death.” The court allowed an additional month for a proper substitution. The day before the new deadline, Atkins’ lawyer filed a motion to substitute Mrs. Atkins, but she was still not yet named as his personal representative. The district court dismissed William’s case. An Illinois probate court appointed Mrs. Atkins as personal representative of William’s estate about ten days later. Mrs. Atkins appeals the district court’s dismissal.
U.S.O. Corp. (“USO”) is incorporated in Delaware but is the wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese company. Its headquarters are in Japan. USO invested in a limited partnership. Like USO, the partnership was incorporated in Delaware. It also had its principal place of business in Japan and the partners all had addresses in Japan. The partnership invested in another partnership, which acquired a 
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Allen Stevo would like to enter the 2008 race for a seat in the U.S. Congress from the Tenth Congressional District in Illinois as an independent candidate. Illinois law generally requires an independent candidate to submit with his or her petition a number of signatures equal to 5% of the number of votes cast in the district in the last election. This requirement does not apply, however, in the first election after each decennial census. Each census is followed by a redistricting, which prevents the application of the 5% rule since there is no prior voting history for the newly drawn districts. For these elections, Illinois requires a flat 5,000 signatures. The 2008 election is not such an election. A resident of the district challenged Stevo’s petition on the ground that it failed to meet the 5% requirement. Stevo admits that he does not meet the 5% target, but it is undisputed that he submitted in excess of 5,000 signatures. He filed suit, claiming that the 5% requirement denies equal protection of the laws and that the 5,000 signature requirement should be applied to all elections. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Stevo appeals.