Expectations Do Not Amount To An Implied Oral Contract

DYNEGY MARKETING AND TRADE v. MULTIUT CORP. (August 4, 2011)

For years, Multuit purchased natural gas wholesale from Dynegy Marketing and Trade. Nachshon Draiman personally guaranteed Multuit's obligation. In 1997, Dynegy expressed interest in acquiring Multuit. Under a confidentiality agreement, it conducted its due diligence. Dynegy ultimately chose not to acquire Multuit but instead entered into a joint venture with one of Multuit's competitors. The relationship soured but Multuit continued to purchase from Dynegy. Multuit was unable to pay its current invoices, however and owed Dynegy in excess of $1.5 million by the end of 2000. On several occasions, Multuit attempted to reach agreement on a long-term price guarantee with Dynegy unsuccessfully. Dynegy ultimately stopped providing gas to Multuit in December 2002 and filed suit. Multuit responded with a host of counterclaims. Shortly after the complaint was filed, the FERC issued a report in which it identified efforts to manipulate price indices in the Western United States energy markets. Dynegy was implicated but the report was limited to the Western United States. In discovery, Multuit attempted to obtain information from Dynegy regarding its price index reporting and calculation. The magistrate judge did not allow it. Dynegy moved for summary judgment on some of its claims and all of Multuit's counterclaims. In response, Multuit submitted an excerpt from the FERC report and a lengthy declaration containing, for the first time, its damage estimates. Judge Nordberg (N.D. Ill.) excluded the declaration and granted Dynegy's motion. After denying Multuit's motion for reconsideration, the court entered judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). The Seventh Circuit remanded for a prejudgment interest calculation. On remand, Multuit again moved for reconsideration and supplemented the record with additional affidavits. The court denied the motion and entered judgment for Dynegy. Multuit appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Kanne and Tinder and District Judge Herndon affirmed. Multuit was chastised by the panel for its "kitchen sink" approach (it presented nine issues) on appeal. The Court considered and rejected each: a) the district court did not err in excluding the declaration when it was the first time Multuit disclosed its damages theory, b) Dynegy's vague statements about "best price" did not amount to an enforceable oral contract, c) there can be no enforceable long-term price agreement when the record presents no evidence of either the price term or duration, d) Dynegy's mistake in failing to invoice Multuit for interest for a period of time did not amount to an implied agreement to forego interest, e) Dynegy offered sufficient proof of its own damages by presenting an expert who testified regarding the invoices and interest calculations, f) the record does not support a conclusion that any alleged price manipulation in the Western United States affected Dynegy's price and therefore its damages, g) Multuit cannot recover on its breach of contract counterclaim when it presented no evidence of damages, h) Multuit cannot recover on its Robinson-Patman Act counterclaim when it presented no evidence of damages, and i) Multuit waived its challenge to the denial of the motion for reconsideration by not addressing the grounds upon which the district court denied it.

Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Dismissing Securities Complaint With Prejudice

FANNON v. GUIDANT CORP. (October 21, 2009)

Guidant Corporation is a worldwide manufacturer of medical devices, including pacemakers and implantable cardioverter defibrillators ("ICDs"). In the 1990s, Guidant released a new ICD model. Within a few years, it discovered a design flaw. Although it corrected the flaw in new production runs, it never recalled the flawed units nor did it advise doctors or the public of the flaw. In 2004 and 2005, Guidant and J&J were involved in merger negotiations. Guidant issued several press statements and filed several SEC forms without mentioning its potential liability arising from the flawed devices. After a young man died and the New York Times prepared to report on the flaws, Guidant disclosed the problems in a letter to physicians. Shortly thereafter, the FDA issued a national recall. Guidant's stock price fell and J&J reconsidered its merger intentions. Eventually, Boston Scientific agreed to buy Guidant. Guidant's share price fluctuated between $63 and $80 during this time period. A number of class-action suits were filed, beginning in 2005. Some were voluntarily dismissed -- a second set was consolidated in the district court. Almost a year after the first complaints were filed, plaintiffs in the consolidated cases filed a consolidated complaint. A few days later, plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated complaint. Almost two years later, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to meet the stringent scienter pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The court also denied plaintiffs leave to amend and denied a rule 59(e) motion to set aside the judgment and allow for an amended complaint. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Wood affirmed. The Court first noted that the plaintiffs, in their appeal, do not challenge the district court's evaluation of the merits of the complaint. They only challenge the court's decisions to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and to not allow an amendment. The Court recognized the jurisprudence which advises that a better course in PSLRA cases is to dismiss without prejudice. The Court also recognized the specific factual backdrop of the case -- that numerous individual cases had been filed, that a consolidated complaint was filed a year later, that the consolidated complaint was amended and that the dismissal came two years after that. Given the amount of time and number of opportunities, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice. With respect to the court's denial of the Rule 59(e) motion, the Court also concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion. The Court relied on the facts that plaintiffs made a strategic decision not to insert new evidence prior to the original ruling on the motion to dismiss and also that the court below was of the opinion that the amended complaint did not adequately address the deficiencies of the original complaint.

Statute of Limitations For A Section 1983 Conspiracy To Prosecute Claim Begins To Run On The Date Of Indictment, Not The Date Of Acquittal

BROOKS v. ROSS (August 20, 2009)

Victor Brooks served on the Illinois Prison Review Board ("PRB"). One of the functions of the PRB is to make certain parole decisions. In 2002, the parole request of inmate Harry Aleman came before the PRB. The hearing was unusual both because of Aleman's notoriety for murder and bribery and because a Department of Corrections employee provided a statement in support of his parole. Brooks cast the only vote in support of parole. Because of the high profile of the situation, the department began an investigation. The investigation resulted in several reports, some of which accused Brooks of accepting bribes to vote in favor of parole. Eventually, Brooks and the department employee were indicted for their conduct -- and later acquitted. Brooks filed suit under § 1983 and state law against numerous state officials, alleging claims of deprivation of due process, malicious prosecution, conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Brooks appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Wood and Tinder affirmed. The Court chose to address the claims under principles of timeliness, sovereign immunity and pleading requirements. First, a § 1983 claim borrows its statute of limitations from a state personal injury action. Here, that limitation is two years. Brooks' complaint was filed within two years of his acquittal, but more than two years after his indictment. The malicious prosecution and federal due process claims both require an allegation of acquittal and are therefore timely. The federal and state conspiracy claims and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim complain of his prosecution. An acquittal is not a pleading element of any of them. Under Illinois law, the Court concluded that the indictment was a single overt act that triggered the statute of limitations for those claims. They are therefore time-barred. Second, Illinois law requires tort suits against the state to be brought in the Illinois Court of Claims. Although the Court recognized the exception if a state actor exceeds his authority, it concluded that the malicious prosecution claim did not fall within the exception and was therefore barred. Finally, the Court concluded that Brooks' due process claim did not meet the pleading requirements of the Supreme Court's recent opinions in Twombly, Erickson and Iqbal. Under those cases, a plaintiff is required to provide notice of his claim, a court must accept allegations as true unless they fail to provide sufficient notice, and the court need not accept conclusory or abstract allegations. Here, Brooks does provide many specific allegations, but the allegations describe conduct that is just as consistent with legal behavior as it is with illegal behavior. The only allegations that adequately describe illegal behavior merely recite the elements of the cause of action and do not put the defendants on notice of their specific conduct that is alleged to have violated the Constitution or law.

Notice Of Appeal Filed After Judgment On Counterclaim Is Treated As If Filed On The Day Of Judgment On The Complaint Months Later

A. BAUER MECHANICAL, INC. v. JOINT ARBITRATION BOARD (March 25, 2009)

A. Bauer Mechanical, Inc. ("Bauer") and Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union 130 ("Union") were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, the Joint Arbitration Board of the Plumbing Contractors' Association and Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union ("Board") has the authority to resolve their disputes. In 2005, the Board found that Bauer had failed to make some required contributions and ordered it to pay over $54,000. Bauer filed a complaint in state court to vacate the award. The Union removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for leave to file instanter an answer to Bauer's complaint and a counterclaim to enforce the arbitration award. The answer and counterclaim were attached to the motion. The district court granted the motion. Bauer did not respond. At a hearing on the Union's motion for entry of judgment, Bauer argued that the pleadings were not properly filed. The court explicitly recognized the pleadings and gave Bauer 14 days to respond to the counterclaim. Bauer filed a response but, again, challenged the propriety of the pleadings and did not address the merits. The court entered judgment on the Union's counterclaim. Bauer filed a timely notice of appeal. A few months later, on the Union's motion, the court dismissed Bauer's complaint and declared all judgments final and appealable. Bauer did not file a timely appeal of that order.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Wood and Williams affirmed. The Court first addressed the jurisdictional issue. The parties all agreed that the final judgment was the judgment of the court dismissing the complaint. Bauer filed its notice of appeal several months earlier. The Court cited Rule 4 (a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which treats a notice of appeal that is filed after a decision but before the entry of judgment as if it was filed on the date of judgment. Here, Bauer's complaint and the Union's counterclaim were mirror images of the other. The Court concluded that Bauer's belief that the earlier order disposed of all issues was reasonable and treated his notice of appeal as if it were filed on the date of judgment.

On the merits, the Court agreed with the district court that the Union's answer and counterclaim were properly considered. The Court agreed with Bauer that a motion is not a pleading. However, relying on the district court's discretion to manage its docket, the fact that the federal rules do not prohibit the attachment of a pleading to a motion and the plain reading of Rules 7 (a), (b), and 10, the Court approved of the district court's approach.