Plaintiffs Adequately Alleged That Defendant's Conduct Was A Plausible Cause Of Some Of Its Loss

ANCHORBANK v. HOFER (August 18, 2011)

Clark Hofer was an AnchorBank employee. Through his employer, he had an individual 401(k) account. One of the investment options in the account was the AnchorBank Unitized Fund, which consisted of cash and AnchorBank stock. In late 2008 and early 2009, Hofer and two colleagues, also bank employees, engaged in trades in the Fund. AnchorBank and the Trustee of the Fund brought suit against Hofer, alleging violations of Sections 9(a) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Wisconsin securities law, and common law claims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. Magistrate Judge Crocker (W.D. Wis.) dismissed the complaint with prejudice. He concluded that plaintiffs failed to meet the loss causation pleading requirements. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Manion, Wood, and Williams reversed and remanded. The only issue on appeal was the sufficiency of the complaint. The Court noted that plaintiffs had to satisfy the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 9(b) general pleading requirements, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sections 9(a) and 10(b) pleading requirements, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act pleading requirements. The Court concluded that plaintiffs satisfied the Rule 8(a) short and plain statement requirement and the Rule 9(b) fraud with particularity requirement. With respect to the latter, the Court noted that the complaint described the setup of the Fund, how it bought and sold stock on the open market, how it maintained its cash-to-stock ratio, how Hofer and his colleagues used their knowledge of Fund practices to buy and sell in ways that affected the price of the underlying stock, and how Hofer and his colleagues enjoyed extraordinary gains in doing so. The Court turned to the pleading requirements of the Securities Exchange Act and the PSLRA. On appeal, Hofer asserts that the complaint failed to adequately allege scienter, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation. The Court disagreed. It summarized the particular allegations of the complaint and found each of the elements adequately alleged. It noted that Hofer had competing explanations for his conduct that could affect scienter and reliance -- but rejected the assertion that they justified dismissal of the complaint. The Court also conceded that general economic conditions could have contributed to the dramatic decline in the value of AnchorBank stock. A plaintiff need not allege or prove that its entire loss is the result of the defendant's conduct -- only that it is a plausible cause of some of the loss.

Public Records Request Is Not "Discovery" Under The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act

AMERICAN BANK v. CITY OF MENASHA (November 29, 2010)

The City of Menasha, Wisconsin financed a power plant conversion by issuing bonds. Unfortunately, the project ended up over-budget and the city defaulted on the bonds. Several bondholders, including American Bank, filed a class action against the City. The suit alleged violations of federal securities law. A few weeks after filing suit, the Bank submitted a public records request to the City pursuant to state law. When Menasha refused to produce the requested records, the Bank obtained an order from a state court ordering compliance. Instead of complying, Menasha sought a stay from the district court in which the class action was pending. Judge Springmann (N.D. Ind.) granted the motion and issued a stay under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, as amended by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. The Act requires that discovery be stayed while a motion to dismiss is pending and authorizes a district court to stay state court discovery proceedings when necessary. The Bank appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Posner, Flaum, and Sykes reversed. The Court first addressed its jurisdiction. Although discovery orders are usually not appealable, there are exceptions – plus, this may not be a discovery order. The Court concluded that jurisdiction was inseparable from the merits. If the Bank is right on the merits, it is not a discovery order but an appealable injunction. If the City is right on the merits, it is a discovery order and unappealable unless it fits within an exception. The Court sided with the Bank. First of all, discovery is a well defined word in federal civil procedure and does not generally include the entirety of a party's investigation. Second, if the Act meant to use it in a different way, there must be a reason based on statute or policy. The policy behind the discovery stay is to prevent one party from using discovery to impose exorbitant costs on the other for the purpose of inducing a settlement. That concern does not exist here, since the cost of complying with the public records request can be charged to the Bank. Menasha concedes that it couldn't refuse a newspaper's request for the same records, nor could it have refused the Bank's request if it made the request a few weeks before filing the complaint rather than a few weeks after. The City not only does not convince the Court to adopt a broad definition of "discovery" in the Act -- it convinces the Court that their interpretation is futile, would create a “precedent of unmanageable scope,” and would hold the law “out to ridicule.”

Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Dismissing Securities Complaint With Prejudice

FANNON v. GUIDANT CORP. (October 21, 2009)

Guidant Corporation is a worldwide manufacturer of medical devices, including pacemakers and implantable cardioverter defibrillators ("ICDs"). In the 1990s, Guidant released a new ICD model. Within a few years, it discovered a design flaw. Although it corrected the flaw in new production runs, it never recalled the flawed units nor did it advise doctors or the public of the flaw. In 2004 and 2005, Guidant and J&J were involved in merger negotiations. Guidant issued several press statements and filed several SEC forms without mentioning its potential liability arising from the flawed devices. After a young man died and the New York Times prepared to report on the flaws, Guidant disclosed the problems in a letter to physicians. Shortly thereafter, the FDA issued a national recall. Guidant's stock price fell and J&J reconsidered its merger intentions. Eventually, Boston Scientific agreed to buy Guidant. Guidant's share price fluctuated between $63 and $80 during this time period. A number of class-action suits were filed, beginning in 2005. Some were voluntarily dismissed -- a second set was consolidated in the district court. Almost a year after the first complaints were filed, plaintiffs in the consolidated cases filed a consolidated complaint. A few days later, plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated complaint. Almost two years later, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to meet the stringent scienter pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The court also denied plaintiffs leave to amend and denied a rule 59(e) motion to set aside the judgment and allow for an amended complaint. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Wood affirmed. The Court first noted that the plaintiffs, in their appeal, do not challenge the district court's evaluation of the merits of the complaint. They only challenge the court's decisions to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and to not allow an amendment. The Court recognized the jurisprudence which advises that a better course in PSLRA cases is to dismiss without prejudice. The Court also recognized the specific factual backdrop of the case -- that numerous individual cases had been filed, that a consolidated complaint was filed a year later, that the consolidated complaint was amended and that the dismissal came two years after that. Given the amount of time and number of opportunities, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice. With respect to the court's denial of the Rule 59(e) motion, the Court also concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion. The Court relied on the facts that plaintiffs made a strategic decision not to insert new evidence prior to the original ruling on the motion to dismiss and also that the court below was of the opinion that the amended complaint did not adequately address the deficiencies of the original complaint.