With No Effectual Pre-Deprivation Remedy, Adequate Post-Deprivation Remedies Satisfy Due Process Concerns

TENNY v. BLAGOJEVICH (August 25, 2011)

An Illinois statute regulates prison commissaries’ sale of goods to inmates. Except for tobacco products, it prohibits any markup over cost in excess of 25%. A 2006 Illinois Inspector General audit concluded that the Illinois Department of Corrections was violating the statute and recommended corrective action. The Department rejected the recommendations and maintained its pricing. Several inmates at the Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet filed grievances. The grievances were denied. The inmates filed two separate lawsuits in federal district court pursuant to § 1983, alleging violations of their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights and violations of the Illinois Constitution. Judges Norgle and Pallmeyer (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Manion, Wood, and Hamilton affirmed and remanded. A procedural due process claim requires that the plaintiff allege a protected property interest, or legitimate claim of entitlement, under state law. Here, the Court assumed, without deciding, that the Illinois statutory cap created such a property interest. Even if there is a property interest, the inmates are not entitled to pre-deprivation review if it would be ineffectual. The Court concluded that no "process" would have prevented the Department from imposing its allegedly unlawful pricing policy. In this situation, an adequate post-deprivation remedy may satisfy due process. The inmates have not even alleged the inadequacy of a post-deprivation remedy. In fact, the Court concluded that the prison grievance procedures, a possible Court of Claims claim, and the availability of a state court claim were adequate post-deprivation remedies. Because both district courts dismissed the complaints with prejudice but neither district court addressed the state constitutional claim, the Court remanded the cases for dismissals of the state claims without prejudice.

Laid Off Tenured Teachers Are Entitled To Recall Procedures

On June 13, 2011, the Court granted the Board's Petition for Rehearing, vacated this opinion, and certified three questions to the Illinois Supreme Court.

CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (March 29, 2011)

Chicago's Board of Education operates the city's public school system and employs more than 20,000 teachers. In the summer of 2010, the Board laid off almost 1300 of them. The Board received an increase in federal funding toward the end of that summer and was able to recall over 700 teachers who had been given the layoff notices. The Board used no particular procedure or policy in the recall. The Board has also continued to fill vacancies as they open up in the system naturally, again without any particular policy with respect to laid off teachers. The Chicago Teachers Union filed suit complaining that the Board was filling many of those vacancies with new hires instead of recalls. They sought injunctive relief. Judge Coar (N.D. Ill.) concluded that the laid-off teachers had a property interest emanating from state law that entitled them to some retention procedures. The court also found that the Union met the other elements of injunctive relief and therefore entered an injunction ordering the Board to rescind the discharges of (although not reinstate) tenured teachers and to promulgate a set of recall rules in conjunction with the Union. The court enjoined further layoffs until such rules had been promulgated. The Board appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Manion (concurring in part and dissenting in part) and Williams and District Judge Clevert affirmed, with modifications to the injunction. In order to be entitled to Fourteenth Amendment due process protection, one must first establish the existence of a protected property (or liberty) interest. Property interest themselves are not created by the Constitution but come from independent sources, frequently state law. In the employment context, a property interest only arises when an employer's discretion to deny employment is limited. Under Illinois law, tenured teachers enjoy permanent employment, subject only to removal for clause. The Court concluded, therefore, that an Illinois tenured teacher has a property interest in continued employment. But establishing the property interest only takes us to the next question -- what process is due. Hearings are generally not necessary when the deprivation of the property interest is caused by a good faith economic layoff. Here, the Union does not challenge the good faith of the layoffs nor does it ask for hearings. Instead, it seeks opportunities for its members to compete for vacancies as they arise. The Court looked to state law prior to 1995, when Illinois had "reserve teachers." Basically, reserve teachers were competent teachers who were laid off but who had significant opportunities with respect to vacant positions. When the Legislature eliminated reserve teachers in 1995, it authorized the Board to establish procedures for layoffs and recall rights. Relying in large part on Illinois law interpreting the new provision, the Court concluded that the Board must use the "authority" given it by the Legislature to formulate layoff and recall procedures. Applying the Mathews weighing analysis, the Court noted an employee has a substantial interest in retaining her job and a significant risk of deprivation without any procedures at all. It concluded that the teachers were entitled to a recall procedure that would allow them a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their qualifications for open positions for a reasonable period of time. With respect to the content of the injunction, however, the Court had two comments. First, it removed the requirement that the Board promulgate rules in conjunction with the Union. Nothing in the statute requires consultation with the Union -- although nothing prohibits it, either. Second, the Court emphasized that the district court's order requiring that the discharges be rescinded did not result in the recall of any teachers. The teachers are still laid-off.

Judge Manion dissented in part and concurred in part, although his concurrence was limited to the majority’s modification of the injunction. First, Judge Manion disagreed with the conclusion that the Illinois statute required the Board to enact recall procedures in the event of the layoff. He pointed out that the Board has established recall procedures in other circumstances, such as a school closing. Second, although teachers have a property interest in their employment, he noted that the Board terminated their employment and honored all process to which they were entitled. No case holds that an employee in that situation has some residual property rights. Third, Judge Manion disagreed with the majority's identification of recall rights as property rights. He pointed out the circularity of the logic. The majority concluded that the recall procedures were the property rights. In order to protect those rights, the Court ordered the Board to develop the procedures. Simply put, even if the statute and other circumstances created a property interest, the property interest cannot be the procedures themselves.

Hybrid Employment Agreement Did Not Create A Property Interest

COLE v. MILWAUKEE AREA TECHNICAL COLLEGE DISTRICT (February 24, 2011)

Milwaukee Area Technical College employed Darnell Cole as its president. His employment agreement, which ran through June of 2011, contained two termination provisions. Under one provision, the College could terminate his employment without cause by giving him 90 days notice and paying him all of this salary and vacation that he would have earned through the end of his contract term. Under another provision, the College could terminate his employment at the end of any month for performance or conduct "considered grounds for dismissal" by the College. In February of 2009, Cole was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. In a February board meeting, the College decided to terminate Cole's employment effective February 28. Cole brought suit pursuant to § 1983 (the College is a creature of Wisconsin law), alleging a due process violation. Magistrate Judge Gorence (E.D. Wis.) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Cole appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Flaum and Wood and District Judge McCuskey affirmed. The threshold question in any due process case, stated the Court, relates to the existence of a property interest. If Cole has a property interest, it must come from his employment agreement and state law. Under Wisconsin law, due process attaches only when the employment agreement requires a "cause" for termination. The Court concluded that Cole’s employment agreement fell somewhere between an at-will employment agreement and a "cause" employment agreement. Although the College needed some reason to terminate Cole's employment without notice and without severance, their discretion to do so was not meaningfully restricted. The Court therefore concluded that Cole did not have a constitutionally protected property interest.

Disciplinary Sanctions That Do Not "Substantially Worsen" Confinement Conditions Do Not Implicate Due Process

MILLER v. DOBIER (February 11, 2011)

Dale Miller is confined pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. While confined, he was disciplined on two separate occasions in 2007 and 2008. In 2007, he was accused of threatening a deputy sheriff. A disciplinary committee found him guilty of those charges and reduced his status within the institution. As a result, he lost certain privileges; including longer visitation, later access to the day room, and access to electronic equipment. In 2008, he was accused of damaging furniture, breaking a window, and threatening staff. Again, a disciplinary committee upheld the charges in a hearing. Miller was placed in "close" status for a month. His punishment again included lost privileges. He had an earlier curfew, no yard privileges, shorter visits, no access to special events, and no use of the library or exercise room. Miller brought suit against institution officials pursuant to § 1983 claiming a denial of procedural due process. Judge Baker (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Miller appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Wood affirmed. The Court never addressed Miller’s evidence of procedural deficiencies. Instead, it concluded that the due process clause was not even implicated. There is no constitutional due process requirement unless there is a deprivation of liberty or property. When a lawfully committed person is subjected to discipline, the due process clause is not implicated unless the institution substantially worsens the conditions of his confinement. Here, even while Miller was in "close" status, he had much freedom. The reduction in his status does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest.

Section 8 Landlord Has No Property Interest In Program Participation

KAHN v. BLAND (December 23, 2010)

The “Section 8” federal housing subsidy program provides rental assistance to low-income families. Although funded federally, the program is administered by local public housing agencies. Both the beneficiary families and the participating landlords must meet certain qualifications and are governed by a host of regulations. In Champaign County, Illinois, the program is run by the Housing Authority of Champaign County (HACC). In 2003, Latif Kahn, a qualified landlord with a contract with HACC, rented a subsidized apartment to Andrew Washington. At Washington' request, and allegedly with the approval of HACC, Kahn also rented some space in the building's basement to Washington outside the program. After Kahn evicted Washington in for nonpayment of rent, Washington brought the existence of this "side lease" to the HACC's executive director. The director advised Kahn that the lease was a violation of program regulations and that he was terminating Kahn's contracts and barring him from the program. Kahn was never given an opportunity to explain or appeal. The HACC sent a letter to each of Kahn's four tenants and advised them that they would have to move. In fact, however, Kahn’s contract with respect to only one of the tenants was terminated pursuant to the letter. Another contract was terminated when the contracted unit failed to pass an inspection. The other two tenants actually remained. One prospective tenant was denied an opportunity to rent an apartment from Kahn and was told by HACC that Kahn was an "undesired person." Kahn brought suit, alleging procedural and substantive due process claims against the director and a due process claim against HACC. Chief Judge McCuskey (C.D. Ill) granted the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff's case. Kahn appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Tinder affirmed. Both the substantive and procedural due process claims require the identification of a property or liberty interest. The Court concluded that Kahn had not established a property interest from a) his termination from the program, b) the termination of the contracts, or c) disputes regarding the remaining contracts. First, notwithstanding his allegations, the record was clear that he was never terminated from the program. The director made threatening statements but had no authority to bar Kahn from the program and, in fact, Kahn continued to participate in the program. Second, although the HACC did refuse to enter into new contracts with Kahn, nothing in the statute or regulations entitles him to enter into new contracts. Finally, Kahn's rights with respect to his existing contracts do not raise constitutional issues. They simply give rise to possible state breach of contract claims. With respect to a liberty interest, the Court concluded that Kahn forfeited the claim -- but also concluded that the claim would not succeed. The liberty interest recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment protects a person's right to pursue an occupation, but not a specific job. Here, although the defendants' conduct may have affected Kahn 's ability to lease to certain individuals, it did not preclude him from his occupation.

Government Employee Who Serves "At The Pleasure" Has No Property Interest In Employment

COVELL v. MENKIS (February 8, 2010)

The Illinois Deaf and Hard of Hearing Commission (the "Commission") was created several years ago to provide services for and advocate on behalf of the hard of hearing. Gerald Covell served as its Director from 1998 until 2003. In July of that year, the Commissioners terminated him. Covell filed suit under § 1983, alleging that defendants violated both his property and liberty interests. Specifically, he alleged that he was let go without any pre-or post-termination process in violation of a property interest. He also alleges that defendants circulated false information about him, without providing him an opportunity to clear his name, in violation of his liberty interest. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Covell had no property interest in this position and that he failed to demonstrate that any particular defendant circulated negative information. Covell appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Manion and Williams affirmed. The Court first addressed the existence of a property interest. Although a property interest can arise from state law, a person must identify a specific statute, rule, or contract that limits the ability of the state to terminate him. The rules governing Covell's position states that he "shall serve at the pleasure of the Commission." The Court rejected Covell's position that an inconsistent right was somehow incorporated into the regulation by its reference to the Personnel Code. Since he had no property interest, he had no right to due process. With respect to his liberty interest claim, the Court stated that the plaintiff must show that he was stigmatized by publicly disclosed information and that he suffered a tangible loss. Specifically, the plaintiff must show that a named defendant made the public disclosure. Here, Covell contends only that the disclosure was made by someone in the government. Without evidence that the disclosure was made by a named defendant, Covell's claim fails.