A Later Filed Qui Tam Action Is "Related" To An Earlier One If It Is Materially Similar to A Situation That Would Have Been Revealed By The Earlier Complaint Or Resulting Investigation
UNITED STATES v. APRIA HEALTHCARE GROUP (May 19, 2010)
Two qui tam actions were filed against Apria Healthcare Group in the late 1990s, accusing Apria of fraudulently billing the Medicare and Medicaid programs from 1995-98. Years later, but while those actions were still pending, Christine Chovanec filed this action, similarly alleging fraudulent billing by Apria from 2002-04 in Illinois. Judge Kocoras (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the action with prejudice pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), which provides that no person may bring a "related action" based on the facts of a pending action brought by another person. Four days later, the earlier cases were settled. Chovanec moved for reconsideration. The court denied. Chovanec appeals.
In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Cudahy and Sykes vacated and remanded. The Court first held that the statute means what it says -- that no person "may . . . bring a related action based on the facts” of another pending action. Any action thus brought must be dismissed, rather than stayed. The Court next addressed whether Chovanec's action was a "related action." It aligned itself with other courts of appeals and concluded that the statute's reference to "facts" meant the material facts in the original relator's complaint. The Court explained that it was the complaints in those cases, not the settlement, that provided the material facts. Those complaints alleged an ongoing national fraud. Therefore, even though Chovanec's allegations referred to later years and a specific office, they were related to the original allegations. Concluding, therefore, that the statute required the dismissal of her complaint, the Court nevertheless vacated the judgment. Now that the original complaints are no longer pending, nothing in § 3730(b)(5) prevents her from refiling. The district court should have dismissed without prejudice.
Curtis Lusby was an engineer at Rolls-Royce Corp. He became suspicious that the company was falsely certifying that one of its aircraft engines met government specifications so he informed his superiors. He claims that the company fired him for doing so. He brought suit under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company punished him for preparing to bring an action under the statute. The parties jointly dismissed the suit in 2003. However, two months earlier, Lusby had filed a qui tam action under seal. The court dismissed the action for failure to plead fraud with particularity and because of the claim preclusion effect of the earlier lawsuit. Lusby appeals.