Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Commentary : In Their Opinion : Lawyer & Attorney Michael E. Rigney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm

JOREN v. NAPOLITANO (February 7, 2011)

Verlaine Joren was a security screener with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at Midway Airport in Chicago. At the age of 63, Smith claimed to have a condition that limited her ability to stand or walk. She asked her supervisor for accommodations, including a relocation to Florida and schedule modifications. Her supervisor was skeptical of her complaints and refused her requests. Joren claims that he even refused to reassign her a "safe distance" from an x-ray machine when she temporarily had a heart monitor without a doctor's clarification of "safe distance." Joren resigned her position in January 2004 after her supervisor confronted her regarding a Social Security claim she had filed. Joren filed suit pursuant to Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging age, gender, and disability discrimination and retaliation. Judge Bucklo (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the complaint, holding that Joren failed to state a cause of action under Title VII and that her Rehabilitation Act claim was foreclosed by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). Joren appeals

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Evans, and Williams affirmed. First, the Court stated that the gender and age discrimination claims were properly dismissed because Joren's complaint did not suggest that gender or age motivated her employer's actions. Instead, the complaint linked those actions exclusively to her disability. Federal employees’ disability claims are generally governed by the Rehabilitation Act, but Congress passed the ATSA after the September 11 attacks. The ATSA established the TSA and gave the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security the authority to hire and fire "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." The Court agreed with the other circuits that have considered the question that the "notwithstanding" language meant that the Rehabilitation Act’s disability discrimination prohibitions did not apply to TSA employees.

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GRATZL v. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGES (April 7, 2010)

Jeanne Gratzl has suffered from incontinence for several years. It has interfered with her ability to perform certain jobs and undertake normal commutes. All seemed well when she was hired by DuPage County for a “control room” court reporting position. Unlike most court reporting positions that require attendance at trials and in courtrooms, her position allowed her to manage her condition well. In fact, she managed it so well that her colleagues and superiors were not aware of it. In 2006, all that changed. The Chief Judge of DuPage County redefined the position of a court reporter – and required all court reporters to do the same job. That meant that all court reporters had to rotate through the control room and the courtrooms. Gratzl disclosed her condition to the Chief Judge. The parties engaged in a series of conversations attempting to reach an accommodation. The only accommodation Gratzl would accept was a full-time assignment to the control room. The Chief Judge offered several accommodations; including no trial assignments, assignments to courtrooms nearest the restrooms, and allowing her to use a hand signal to indicate to a presiding judge that she needed a break. When she rejected these accommodations, the County terminated her employment. Gratzl brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on the ground that Gratzl was not disabled. Gratzl appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Manion, and Williams affirmed. The Court noted the similar requirements of both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. A plaintiff must show that she is a qualified individual, with a disability, of which the defendant is aware, and for which the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate. Although the Court briefly addressed whether Gratzl had a disability, which was the basis of the district court's ruling, it ultimately decided it did not have to resolve that issue. Instead, it addressed whether Gratzl was a "qualified individual," meaning whether she was able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations. The Court focused on the employer's legitimate description of the functions of the job. Here, that included rotating through the control room and the courtrooms. The fact that Gratzl was able to perform the functions of her prior job was not the issue. The County eliminated that job for legitimate reasons. It is not required to maintain a job, for which an employee is qualified, that it no longer believes is necessary or appropriate. Since Gratzl basically concedes that she cannot perform the job as it is now defined, she is not a “qualified individual.” As an alternative ground, the Court concluded that the accommodations offered by the County were reasonable under the ADA. Her only real objection to the accommodations was that the disruption to the courtrooms necessitated by her frequent breaks would be an embarrassment to her. She is not entitled to reject a reasonable accommodation for that reason.

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TEAL v. POTTER (March 20, 2009)

Joanne Teal had been employed by the U. S. Postal Service for almost 20 years when, during an altercation, she struck her supervisor's hand. Although the Postal Service attempted to discharge her, a grievance arbitrator determined that she should be suspended instead. Before she could be reinstated, however, Teal had to demonstrate her physical and mental fitness to resume her duties. For over eight months, the Postal Service went to great lengths to accommodate Teal's needs in scheduling the examinations. Finally, in July of 2003, the Postal Service advised Teal that they were terminating her employment. In the meantime, Teal filed an EEOC complaint in January of 2003, complaining that the original termination of her employment was discriminatory. Teal sued the Postal Service pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. The district court concluded that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and granted summary judgment to the Postal Service.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Rovner and Evans vacated and remanded. The Court that the Rehabilitation Act, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, requires a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action. Additionally, a plaintiff cannot complain of conduct that was not the subject of an EEOC charge. Here, Teal's EEOC charge complained of discrimination prior to her original discharge in March of 2002. The district court complaint, on the other hand, complains of her July 2003 dismissal. The 2003 dismissal was based on Teal's noncompliance with the conditions of her reinstatement, not the incident with her supervisor. The Court concluded that Teal had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Court remanded the case for a dismissal without prejudice.

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