ANDONISSAMY v. HEWLETT-PACKARD CO. (November 7, 2008)
Sanjay Andonissamy, a French citizen of Indian ancestry, began his employment with Hewlett-Packard (“HP”) in April of 2001. He was in the country on an HP-sponsored H-1B visa. [The following is Andonissamy’s version of the story – HP’s version differs greatly] After the events of September 11, 2001, Ken Smith, Andonissamy’s supervisor, began to make derogatory racial, ethnic, and nationalist remarks to and about Andonissamy. Andonissamy frequently complained to Smith’s supervisor. Smith placed Andonissamy on remedial performance plans, allegedly in retaliation for Andonissamy’s complaints about Smith. Andonissamy began taking medication for anxiety and depression in 2002. He was being treated, but his physician never placed him on any restricted work schedule. Andonissamy’s condition worsened in early 2003 after the deaths of his brother and nephew. In May of 2003, Smith made a false report to the company implicating Andonissamy as a security threat. HP fired Andonissamy on June 23, 2003. On September 16, Andonissamy filed an EEOC complaint alleging national origin discrimination. The EEOC dismissed his complaint and issued a right to sue letter. Andonissamy filed a complaint in federal court in April of 2004. In addition to his complaints of national origin discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Andonissamy added a Family and Medical Leave Act count. In November of 2005, Andonissamy added Smith as a defendant on an assault count. The district court dismissed Smith and granted summary judgment to HP. Andonissamy appeals.
In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first addressed Andonissamy’s Title VII hostile work environment claim. In order to survive summary judgment, Andonissamy had to show that a) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment, b) the harassment was based on his national origin, c) it was severe and pervasive enough to amount to a hostile and abusive environment, and d) there exists a basis for employer liability. The Court did not address the first three elements because it found no basis for employer liability. An employer can be vicariously liable for the conduct of a supervisor but can only be liable for the conduct of a co-worker if the company was negligent in discovering or remedying the harassment. A supervisor for purposes of Title VII is the person with the ability to affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. Smith, although he was Andonissamy’s “supervisor” in the sense that he directed his performance, was not a Title VII supervisor. There was no evidence that Smith was able "to hire, fire, promote, demote, discipline or transfer" Andonissamy. In order to hold HP liable for the acts of Smith as co-worker, Andonissamy had to establish that he complained or that the discrimination was so pervasive that HP’s knowledge could be inferred. Although Andonissamy did complain to Smith’s supervisor, he did not specifically complain about national origin discrimination. The Court agreed with the district court that Andonissamy therefore did not make out a Title VII claim. With respect to his companion § 1981 claim, the Court stated that a plaintiff can proceed under the direct or indirect method. The direct method requires evidence that an adverse employment action was based on the plaintiff's national origin. The Court found no such evidence in the record. Under the indirect method, a plaintiff must establish, among other elements, that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate performance expectations. The Court noted that the record contained numerous references to Andonissamy’s performance problems. The Court concluded that Andonissamy was therefore unable to establish a § 1981 claim under either method.
Andonissamy’s retaliation claim could also be established under the direct or indirect method. The indirect method for retaliation, like discrimination, contains an element that Andonissamy was meeting HP’s performance obligations. The Court rejected Andonissamy’s indirect method for establishing his retaliation claim for the same reason it rejected it for his discrimination claim. Under the direct method, Andonissamy had to establish that: a) he engaged in statutorily protected activity, b) his employer took an adverse employment action, and c) there was a causal connection between the two. The Court held that his complaints to HP did not include complaints of national origin discrimination. He was thus unable to establish the statutorily protected activity element. The Court concluded that he failed to establish a retaliation claim under either method. With respect to the FMLA count, the Court noted that Andonissamy never asked for any leave and did not exhibit any dramatic changes in behavior that would have put HP on notice of a need for leave. The Court agreed with the district court that Andonissamy failed to meet his burden under the FMLA.
Finally, the Court addressed Andonissamy’s assault claim against Smith. The assault claim was added to the case after the statute of limitations on the claim had expired. Andonissamy argued that the claim related back to the original claim and was thus permissible under FRCP 15(c). The Court affirmed the dismissal, stating that a claim against a new defendant relates back only when there is a case of mistaken identity. Since Smith supervised Andonissamy for years, that cannot be the case here.