Seventh Circuit Dodges Intra- and Inter-Circuit Conflict Regarding Res Judicata And Bankruptcy

MATRIX IV, INC. v. AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST CO. OF CHICAGO (July 28, 2011)

Stylemaster and Matrix IV were both in the molded-plastics industry in the 1990s. In 1997, Stylemaster borrowed money from American National Bank and pledged all of its assets and property as security. In 2001, Stylemaster placed a number of larger-than-usual orders with Matrix. Stylemaster became delinquent on its payments. Matrix brought suit for breach of contract in 2002. Shortly thereafter, Stylemaster filed for bankruptcy. Matrix submitted a $7.2 million claim and American National submitted a $9.6 million claim. Stylemaster's owners formed a new company and purchased Stylemaster's assets at a bankruptcy sale. Matrix objected to the sale and also moved to dismiss the bankruptcy petition on the grounds of fraud. The bankruptcy court, after a hearing, approved the sale. Matrix filed further objections and a motion to reconsider, continuing to insert fraud on the part of Stylemaster and its owners. The bankruptcy court found no evidence of fraud or collusion and denied Matrix's motion. American National filed an adversary proceeding seeking a declaration that its lien had priority over Matrix's. Again, Matrix asserted its allegations of fraud in response. After a trial, the bankruptcy judge concluded that American National's lien had priority, again rejecting Matrix’s claims of fraud and collusion. The district court and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, Matrix filed a separate suit against American National and Gateway, another company formed by Stylemaster's principals. The complaint alleged common law fraud and RICO violations and parroted Matrix's allegations of fraud and collusion made in the bankruptcy court. Judge Norgle (N.D. Ill.) entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of American National and Gateway, concluding that Matrix's claims were barred by both res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court denied, however, Gateway's request for Rule 11 sanctions. Matrix appeals. Gateway cross-appeals -- and seeks frivolous appeal sanctions.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Bauer and Sykes and District Judge Griesbach affirmed. The Court addressed the two concepts at issue. Res judicata (or claim preclusion) requires party identity, cause of action identity, and a final judgment on the merits. Here, the only disagreement is cause of action identity and final judgment. Collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion) is a narrower concept and requires that the issue be the same issue as in the prior litigation, that the issue was actually litigated, that a determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment, and that the party against whom the concept is used was fully represented. The Court first addressed res judicata. It concluded that Matrix's fraud allegations are the same basic allegations it made in the bankruptcy court and that there was a final judgments on the merits. Instead of concluding, however, that res judicata/claim preclusion barred the suit, the Court turned to its 1990 decision in Barnett. Barnett addressed a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and the difference between "core" and "non-core" proceedings. There, the Court held that a later-filed RICO claim, because it was non-core, was not barred by res judicata even though the claims had been raised in an earlier bankruptcy proceeding. But Barnett is inconsistent with the Court's own pre-and post-Barnett jurisprudence as well as with other circuit’s decisions. Because the matter was not briefed and because a narrower ground existed on which to resolve the case, the Court did not resolve the conflict. Instead, it concluded that the elements of collateral estoppel were clearly present and that Matrix was thus barred from relitigating the issues it raised in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Court also affirmed the district court's denial of sanctions, concluding that Matrix's claims were at least colorable.

Complaint Arising From State Court Child Custody Orders Is Barred By Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

GOLDEN v. HELEN SIGMAN & ASSOCIATES (July 2, 2010)

Bruce Golden and his wife were involved in a bitter and hostile divorce. The dispute centered principally on the division of their assets and the custody of their only child. Golden added a battlefield when he brought suit in federal court. The defendants included his child’s court appointed representative and his wife’s attorneys, close friend and neighbor, and two business associates. His claims were based on federal copyright law, RICO, and § 1983 as well as several state law theories. He accused the lawyers of defamation, the lawyers and business associates of copyright infringement, the representative of defamation and failing to maintain neutrality, and the neighbor of a false 911 report. Judge Gottschall (N.D. Ill.) stayed the copyright infringement claim pending completion of the state court divorce proceedings and dismissed all other claims -- the RICO claim for failure to plead sufficiently the predicate acts and pattern of racketeering activity, the § 1983 claim because the representative had not acted under color of state law and enjoyed absolute immunity, and the state law claims by choosing not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The lawyers, the representative, and the friend all sought sanctions under Rule 11. The district court concluded that some of the claims did violate Rule 11 and ordered Golden to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees for the offending claims. Golden settled with the attorneys and appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Wood, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first noted that the only merits decision challenged on appeal was the § 1983 claim against the representative. It identified a potentially thorny issue with respect to absolute immunity. Although a child representative is entitled to absolute immunity when carrying out its court appointed duties, it may not be when it functions in a role closer to that of the child's attorney. The complaint did allege acts relating to that role. The Court declined to resolve that issue, however, instead identifying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a jurisdictional bar. Under that doctrine, a party may not seek redress in a lower federal court for an injury caused by a state court judgment. Here, the Court determined that the only injury Golden complained of arose directly from the state court custody orders. The Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the § 1983 claim. With respect to sanctions, the Court first rejected Golden's argument that the Rule 11 motions were not timely -- both because he failed to raise it in the district court and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing them. On the fees themselves, the Court concluded that the district court was well within its discretion in identifying counts on which to impose a sanction and in its method of calculating the amount of the sanction. Finally, the Court declined to impose sanctions on Golden for the appeal. Although he raised several frivolous arguments, he did advance some positions that could not be dismissed summarily.

A Court Should Not Consider A Lawyer's Ability To Pay In Imposing Sanctions Under 28 U.S.C. §1927

SHALES v. GENERAL CHAUFFEURS, SALES DRIVERS AND HELPERS LOCAL UNION NO. 330 (February 27, 2009)

The losers is in a contested union election sued the winners. The defendants prevailed on all counts. As discovery proceeded during the case, it became apparent that plaintiffs could not support some of their claims. Defendants demanded that some claims be withdrawn, to no avail. Defendants asked for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §1927 and FRCP 11. The court ordered plaintiffs’ attorney, James Banks, to pay $80,000 in sanctions. Banks appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Rovner and Williams affirmed. The Court first addressed the defendant’s argument that the appeal was not timely. Defendants argued that Bank's motion to reconsider should not have suspended the time for appeal because it lacked merit. The Court declined to adopt such a rule. The actual rule is that the existence of the motion, and not it's merit, is what suspends the time for appeal. The Court then addressed Bank's principal argument -- that the district court should have taken into account his ability to pay in determining a sanction. The Court agreed that Rule 11 requires a court to take into account a sanctioned party’s resources. However, the Court noted that the lower court also imposed sanctions under § 1927, with a finding of bad faith. The Court concluded that tort damage principles apply to a determination of sanctions under § 1927. As such, the measure of damages depends on the victim's loss, not a lawyer's ability to pay.