School District Failed To Prove That "Be Happy, Not Gay" Slogan Threatened Substantial Disruption

ZAMECNIK v. INDIAN PRAIRIE SCHOOL DISTRICT (March 1, 2011)

Heidi Zamecnik and Alexander Nuxoll were public high school students who opposed homosexuality on religious grounds. In response to a "Day of Silence" promoted by a group critical of those who harassed homosexuals, they participated in a "Day of Truth" the next following school day. Zamecnik wore a shirt bearing the phrase "Be Happy, Not Gay." A school official covered the words "Not Gay" and prohibited the phrase as a violation of the school’s rule against derogatory comments. Zamecnik and Nuxoll brought suit and sought a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the application for an injunction. Almost 3 years ago, the Court reversed. The Court reviewed the phrase as "only tepidly negative" and concluded that the school district presented insufficient facts to support a conclusion that the words would lead to substantial disruption under Tinker. Judge Hart (N.D. Ill.) eventually granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, awarded each $25 in damages, and entered a permanent injunction. The permanent injunction is more expansive than the preliminary one in that it runs in favor of all students and includes not just shirts but also all clothing and personal items. The District appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne, and Rovner affirmed. The Court first rejected the District's argument that injunctive relief was moot because Zamecnik had graduated and Nuxoll had finished his classes and was about to graduate. The Court noted that the injunction now runs in favor of all students, not just the named plaintiffs. Such an injunction is proper as long as the group is specified. The District then argued that it presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment. The Court considered the three types of evidence presented. The first was "negligible" -- an affidavit of a school official recounting statements by unidentified school officials themselves recounting statements by unidentified students purportedly identifying incidents of homosexual harassment. The second type was evidence of the harassment of Zamecnik. But statements that are otherwise permissible cannot be suppressed simply because they are met by violence or harassment by those who oppose the speaker's view. In addition, the harassment was not engendered by the T-shirt, but by the lawsuit. The third piece of evidence presented by the District was an expert report, of which the Court was particularly critical. The opinion section of the expert’s 38-page expert report consisted of 2 1/2 pages and, in the Court's view, failed to satisfy any of the Rule 702 requirements. In fact, the Court noted that his conclusion -- that the phrase at issue is "particularly insidious" in a public school setting -- "comes out of nowhere." The expert described no methodology or research and gave no indication that he is familiar at all with the school the plaintiffs attended. His opinions are nothing more than mere conclusions. The district court was correct in concluding that this evidence was insufficient to survive summary judgment. Finally, the Court affirmed the $25 damage awards as justified by the record.

District Court Properly Disallowed Lay Opinion Testimony On Lost Profits When Witness Had No Particularized Personal Knowledge On the Subject

GERHARD VON DER RUHR v. IMMTECH INTERNATIONAL, INC. (June 30, 2009)

Gerhard Von der Ruhr founded Immtech and Septech, both medical technology companies. Immtech patented a human protein product. Septech claims it has a worldwide license and a right to purchase the product from Immtech. Septech claims that Immtech breached the agreement, resulting in lost profits. Septech offered the lay opinion testimony of Von der Ruhr that, had Immtech not breached: a) Septech would have partnered with a major, undetermined pharmaceutical company, b) the pharmaceutical company would have developed and received FDA clearance of the product at its cost, c) the product would have immediately captured half of the target market, and d) Septech would have received 5% of sales proceeds. He would have testified that Septech’s lost sales amount to $42 million. The district court did not allow the testimony and precluded the lost profits claim. Septech appeals.

Von der Ruhr had an option to purchase 24,390 shares of Immtech stock at $.34 a share, exercisable in whole or in part by May 1, 2001. He attempted to exercise the options in April of that year and sent a check in an amount equal to the number of shares times $.34. The company never issued the shares. Instead, relying on the fact that the option price was really $. 3409594, returned the check. A jury found that Immtech breached the contract and also found that three individual officers were guilty of tortious interference with the contract. The individuals appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Wood affirmed. With respect to the lay opinion testimony, the Court recognized that lay opinion testimony is permissible in limited situations when the witness has particularized, personal knowledge. Von der Ruhr had no such knowledge – he never entered into the kind of licensing agreement he described, he never brought a pharmaceutical to market, he never even made a profit in the business, and he had no knowledge of the market. The Court found no abuse of discretion in disallowing the testimony.

With respect to the tortious interference, the Court conceded that there was evidence to support the defendants’ assertions of innocence. However, a jury found otherwise and the Court concluded that their decision was not irrational based on other evidence -- Von der Ruhr was treated differently, they originally authorized the share transfer, only $23.40 was at stake, there was a history of tension and strife, etc.

Medical Expert's Failure To Present A Theory Linking Plaintiffs' Symptoms With Their Exposure To PCE Results In Disqualification

CUNNINGHAM v. MASTERWEAR CORP. (June 23, 2009
 

The Cunninghams owned a building in Martinsville, Indiana in which they operated a photographic studio from 1986 until 2004. The building next door contained a dry cleaning establishment. Soon after the Cunninghams made the building their residence, they both began to experience headaches and other physical maladies. They moved out as soon as the EPA advised them that high levels of perchloroethylene (PCE), a chemical used in dry cleaning, in their home posed a potential health risk. The Cunninghams brought an action for common law nuisance, seeking damages for both their physical injuries and their loss of property value. The court disqualified their only medical expert and barred them from testifying regarding appraisals of their property. The court then granted summary judgment to the defendant. The Cunninghams appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Manion and Kanne affirmed. Although the expert had concluded that all of the Cunningham’s symptoms were caused by exposure to PCE, the Court noted that he was not a toxicologist, and he presented no scientific theory that linked the Cunningham’s exposure level to their symptoms. The Court concluded, therefore, he presented no evidence upon which a trier of fact could rely to conclude that the exposure was the cause of the ailments. With respect to the valuation of the property, the Court stated that a property owner can testify about the value of his property if he is an expert on property values or if he has personal knowledge. Cunningham simply wanted to repeat others’ assessments of the property’s value. The Court concluded that the testimony was properly disallowed as hearsay. The Court added that, even if the testimony was allowed, there was no evidence regarding the cause of any loss in value. Since the Cunningham’s were entitled only to the loss of value that could be fairly attributed to the PCE, as opposed to market forces or otherwise, they could not have prevailed even with the testimony.