Incoherent Pleading Properly Dismissed After Two Failed Attempts To Cure Defects

STANARD v. NYGREN (September 19, 2011)

H. Michael Stanard and his wife built an outdoor amphitheater on property they owned in rural McHenry County, Illinois. For years, they hosted public events there, including a 40th anniversery tribute to Woodstock  in 2009. They brought suit against the Sheriff of McHenry County and 22 of his deputies, as well as the County itself, alleging that Sheriff Nygren forced them to use County deputies for security at these events at inflated rates. The original complaint contained 28 counts, asserting, among others, §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, RICO claims, and state law claims. The complaint made no effort to identify which defendants were guilty of what conduct. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). After missing numerous deadlines to respond, the plaintiffs finally responded almost six months late. Judge Kapala (N.D. Ill.) granted the motion. He dismissed several frivolous counts with prejudice and dismissed others without prejudice, giving plaintiffs' attorney an opportunity to be plead more concisely. Again, plaintiffs missed deadlines before filing a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Very few of the original complaint's deficiencies were corrected. Even some specific concerns addressed by the district court in its original ruling were ignored. The court denied the motion but gave plaintiffs yet another chance. Again, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint without correcting the complaint’s fundamental deficiencies. The district court dismissed the federal claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Manion, Rovner, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first noted that plaintiffs' counsel's inability to meet deadlines spilled over into the Seventh Circuit. Notwithstanding three extensions, the brief was filed late and without a proper jurisdictional statement. The Court turned to the merits. It noted that the Rules 8 and 10 pleading requirements are meant to ensure that a complaint puts the defendant on notice of the claims against him. When a complaint is unintelligible and lacks the coherence and organization to put a defendant on notice, dismissal is an appropriate remedy. The Court concluded that the Stanard’s complaint was just that. It cited the numerous sentences in excess of 100 words, the lack of any cohesive core allegation against the defendants, the numerous conclusory allegations, and the grammatical errors, just to name a few. Plaintiffs were given two opportunities, with specific instructions, to correct these deficiencies and failed to do so. Although leave to amend a complaint is normally allowed, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint under these circumstances. In addition to affirming the dismissal, the Court ordered plaintiffs' counsel to show cause why he should not be disciplined and ordered the clerk to forward a copy of its opinion to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois.

Dismissal For Want Of Prosecution Is Not A PLRA "Strike"

PAUL v. MARBERRY (September 6, 2011)

Jeffrey Paul, an inmate in an Indiana federal prison, brought suit alleging that prison personnel used excessive force in removing him from his cell, in violation of the Eight Amendment. It was the fifth lawsuit that Paul had filed while in custody. Each of the prior four lawsuits had been dismissed as unintelligible under Rule 8(a)(2). In each case, the court gave Paul leave to amend. In each case, Paul did not take advantage of that opportunity. In each case, the court dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Judge Lawrence (S.D. Ind.) denied Paul's request to proceed in forma pauperis on the grounds that he had three "strikes" under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Paul appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit judges Posner, Kanne, and Hamilton reversed and remanded. The statute imposes a "strike" when a complaint is dismissed as "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim." But Paul's strikes are not for those reasons. All of his complaints were dismissed for failure to prosecute, a basis not listed in the statute. The Court noted, however, that the proper procedure after a plaintiff fails to take advantage of permission to amend an unintelligible complaint is a dismissal with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a plaintiff, particularly a pro se prisoner plaintiff, should be allowed to rely on what courts actually did, not what they should have done. None of Paul's prior dismissals constituted strikes. He should be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis.

Bare-Bone Pleadings Sufficiently Allege Fair Housing Act Discrimination

SWANSON v. CITIBANK (July 30, 2010)

Gloria Swanson, an African-American, brought suit against Citibank and its appraiser alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act and common law fraud. She alleged the following facts: She applied for a home equity loan at a local Citibank branch. She became suspicious that the bank was trying to discourage African-American applications when a bank representative told her she had to be accompanied by her husband (a joint owner of the property). She was also told that Citibank's loan standards were stricter than those of a competing bank which had already denied her a loan. Nevertheless, she returned the following day and completed the application process. Based in large part on Swanson's statement that the home was worth $270,000, Citibank conditionally approved a $50,000 loan. However, when an independent appraiser retained by Citibank appraised the home at only $170,000, Citibank rejected the application. Swanson later ordered her own appraisal, which came in at $240,000. Judge Zagel (N.D. Ill.) granted defendants' motions to dismiss. Swanson appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner (dissenting in part) and Wood affirmed in part and reversed in part. The dismissal gave the Court the opportunity to review the pleading standards in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Twombly, Erickson, and Iqbal. First, the Court noted that none of the decisions questioned the validity of Rule 8's requirement of a "short and plain statement of the claim." Nevertheless, Twombly and Iqbal referred to a "plausibility" requirement. The Court viewed that requirement as one in which a court asks if whether it could happen, not whether it did happen. Applying those principles to Swanson's allegations against Citibank, the Court concluded that her bare-bone allegations of the type of discrimination, the discriminator, and the setting of the discrimination were sufficient to state a Fair Housing Act claim. Her fraud claim, however, implicated the "state with peculiarity" requirement of Rule 9(b) and an actual damages pleading requirement. Since Swanson did not plead any damages, her fraud claim was properly dismissed. Applying the principles to Swanson's claims against the appraiser, the Court again concluded that her bare-bone allegations that the appraiser understated the value of her home because of her race stated a claim under the Fair Housing Act. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the fraud claims for the same reason as it did those against Citibank.

Judge Posner agreed with the majority's treatment of the fraud claims but dissented from their treatment of the housing discrimination claims. He believed that the complaint set out an "obvious alternative explanation" for the actions of both the bank and the appraiser. With respect to the bank, Judge Posner cited the economic downturn, the fact that Swanson had already been denied a loan by another bank, and the fact that the appraisal suggested any loan would be undersecured. With respect to the appraiser, he noted the inexact nature of the business and the fact that errors are frequently made. Iqbal teaches us that if there is an "obvious alternative" to the invidious discrimination alleged by the plaintiff, the discrimination alternative is not a plausible one.