Defendant Is Not Awarded Fees For Improper Removal Because Of Its Delay In Alerting Court

MICROMETL CORP. v. TRANZACT TECHNOLOGIES (August 24, 2011)

Micrometl and Tranzact were parties to a services agreement that went sour. Micrometl brought suit in state court, alleging that Tranzact had over-billed it by more than $100,000. Tranzact removed the case to federal court. In discovery, Tranzact learned that Micrometl had received funds from third parties that reduced Tranzact's liability to less than $40,000. It also learned that Micrometl received those funds prior to the time it filed suit. Although Tranzact knew that this information brought diversity jurisdiction into question because of the amount in controversy requirement, it did nothing. Discovery closed five months later and the parties participated in a settlement conference five months after that. It was only after the unsuccessful settlement conference that Tranzact moved to remand the case to state court. Magistrate Judge Nolan (N.D. Ill.) concluded that the plaintiff could not meet the amount in controversy requirement and remanded the case to state court. She denied, however, Tranzact's motions for fees and costs. Transact appeals from the order denying fees.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Flaum, Wood, and Tinder affirmed. The Court noted that the removal statute allows a district court to award fees and costs when a case is improperly removed. Usually, it is a plaintiff who seeks a fee award against a defend who improperly removed. Here, it is the defendant seeking fees. Although the Court noted the unusual situation, it concluded that there is no barrier to awarding fees to a defendant under the statute. The Court also concluded, however, that the district court did not err in refusing to award fees. The district court correctly concluded that Micrometl knew or should have known that it could not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement and should have alerted the court at the time of the removal petition. Equally troubling to the district court, however, was Tranzact's conduct. It waited 10 months after it discovered the truth to alert the district court to the situation. The Court rejected Tranzact’s nonsensical argument that it could not alert the court because of an order to participate in mediation. It also rejected the argument that the fact that a case can be remanded "any time" means that its delay in informing the court should not be considered. Tranzact's conduct wasted judicial resources and imposed costs on both parties. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award fees under § 1447(c). Tranzact also sought fees under § 1927. But § 1927 is a sanctions statute that requires a finding of bad faith. The Court deferred to the magistrate judge's finding of no bad-faith. It pointed out, for example, that Micrometl did not exaggerate its damages in order to get into federal court. It originally filed in state court and had no jurisdictional reason to overstate its damages.

§ 1927 Sanctions Must Be Based On A Lawyer's Direct Misdeeds

FM INDUSTRIES v. CITICORP CREDIT SERVICES (July 22, 2010)

FM Industries brought a copyright infringement suit against Citicorp Credit Services. Judge Conlon (N.D. Ill.) found material disputes with respect to FM’s prospective relief and Citicorp’s ongoing infringement and set the case for trial. FM's lawyer, Wayne Rhine, was late in his obligation to prepare a draft pretrial order. When he did so, it was "egregiously noncompliant." Despite extensions of time and cooperation from the defendants, Rhine never fixed the problem. Eventually, the court dismissed the case for want of prosecution. The district court awarded approximately $750,000 in attorneys’ fees to the defendants under the copyright statute. The court also found that Rhine and his co-counsel William McGrath had vexatiously multiplied the proceedings under § 1927 and imposed a joint and several sanction of $35,000. FM, Rhine, and McGrath appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Wood and Tinder affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court first noted that any argument on the merits was irrelevant. The only reason the case did not go to trial was the dismissal sanction. On that issue, the Court had no difficulty in finding it proper. The non-compliant pretrial order with was, in the Court's words, the "straw that broke the camel's back." The Court recited the delays, the warnings, the absurd damage demands, the missed time limits, the overreaching discovery demands -- the list went on. The dismissal sanctioned was permissible under Rule 16 and was proportionate to the conduct. With respect to the statutory award of fees, the Court stated that a prevailing defendant is presumed entitled to fees under the statute and FM presented no reason to reverse that presumption. Finally, with respect to § 1927 sanctions, the Court concluded that Rhine's litigation behavior was vexatious and deserving of sanctions. McGrath, however, presented a different story. Although he did file an appearance and signed five pleadings, he was not accused of any direct misdeeds. He cannot be sanctioned under § 1927 for the misdeeds of his co-counsel or even for his failure to prevent them. The Court reversed the award of sanctions against McGrath.