Complaint Does Not Amount To Protected Activity Without A Reasonable Belief That Conduct Violated The Law

O'LEARY v. ACCRETIVE HEALTH, INC. (September 21, 2011)

Accretive Health is a Chicago-based firm that provides consulting services to hospitals. It hired Joseph O'Leary in early 2005. Although the firm was initially satisfied with O'Leary's performance, it started having reservations in mid-to-late 2006. It even replaced him at one of the hospitals for which he was responsible at the request of the hospital's CFO. In late 2006, O'Leary learned that one of his female reports had made sexually charged remarks at a company dinner. O'Leary reported the incident to his superiors. At the same time, O’Leary expressed his belief that the same female was treating an African-American subordinate in a harsh manner. A company investigation into the sexual remarks concluded that the employee exercised poor judgment but did not violate any company policy. She was reprimanded. In December of 2006, Accretive terminated O'Leary’s employment. O'Leary brought suit under Title VII and § 1981, alleging that his termination was in retaliation for his actions opposing sexual and racial discrimination. Judge Conlon (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Accretive. O'Leary appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy and Rovner and District Judge Adelman affirmed. Both Title VII and § 1981 prohibit retaliation against those who oppose the discriminatory practices made illegal by those statutes. The Court first addressed whether O'Leary established that he engaged in protected activity -- that is, that he took some action in opposition to prohibited discrimination. The Court concluded that he did not with respect to the sexual remarks. Given the relatively tame nature of those remarks and the facts that there was only one incident and that no one present felt harassed, O'Leary could not have reasonably believed that they constituted prohibited sexual harassment. The Court concluded that O'Leary did establish that he engaged in protected activity with respect to the employee’s treatment of her African American subordinate. Although the record is not very clear, the Court concluded that a fair reading supports that conclusion. O'Leary testified that he discussed his concern about race discrimination with his superiors, that his concern was based on more than one incident, and that the conduct resulted in the employee’s resignation. Satisfied that O'Leary met the protected activity requirement, the Court considered his claim under both the direct and indirect methods of proof. It easily rejected his claim under the direct method. O'Leary relied almost exclusively on the temporal proximity between his complaint and his discharge. But temporal proximity is rarely enough, by itself, and the timing in this case does not suggest retaliation. With respect to the indirect method, the Court concluded that O'Leary could neither show that he was meeting his employer’s expectations nor that Accretive's stated reasons for firing him were perpetual. Although there are issues of fact with respect to O'Leary's performance, the record contains sufficient undisputed facts to support the conclusion that he was discharged because of his performance.

Court Finds Sufficient Evidence of Retaliation to Uphold Jury Verdict

PICKETT v. SHERIDAN HEALTH CARE CENTER (June 25, 2010)

Danielle Pickett was employed as a housekeeper at the Sheridan Health Care Center in Zion, Illinois. In 2005 and 2006, she was the victim of several incidences of inappropriate remarks and touching by nursing home residents. Although the Center responded to her complaints, the promised response never quite succeeded. In a June 2006 meeting with several Center staff members, the Center agreed to reassign Pickett from cleaning residents' rooms, although, according to Pickett, the Center's VP of Operations suggested that Pickett invited the inappropriate conduct. The next morning, Pickett had a very emotional conversation with the Center's Administrator. According to Pickett, the Administrator said some things that indicated that her job may be in jeopardy. The meeting ended with Pickett still upset and in tears. Instead of resuming her assigned tasks, she left the Center. She called the Administrator the next day to ask if she still was employed. He consulted with the VP of Operations and advised Pickett that she no longer had a job. Beginning about a month later, after Picket filed an EEOC claim, the Center offered on several occasions to reinstate Pickett. She refused several such offers but eventually returned to the Center in January of 2007. She brought suit against the Center for sexual harassment and for retaliatory firing under Title VII. Judge Pallmeyer (N.D. Ill) granted summary judgment to the Center on the harassment claim. The retaliation claim went to trial. The jury found for Pickett and awarded $15,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages. The court awarded back pay and injunctive relief. The Center appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Kanne, and Evans affirmed. The Court first rejected the Center's argument that Pickett could not prevail on the retaliation claim because she could not prevail on the harassment claim. In order to prevail on retaliation, a plaintiff need only show statutorily protected conduct, adverse action, and a causal link. The Court found that there was sufficient evidence of each of those elements in the record -- the jury was entitled to find in Pickett's favor. Each of the Center's other arguments was also rejected: a) counsel’s "send some message" language in closing argument was not improper, b) the compensatory damage award was not excessive and did not require corroborating evidence from a third party, and c) the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the punitive award to stand in light of the evidence that supported a conclusion that the Center knew it might be retaliating when it terminated Pickett's employment.

Sexual-Harassment Plaintiff Cannot Establish A Tangible Employment Action When She Simply Stopped Reporting For Work

ROBY v. CWI, INC. (August 27, 2009)

Misty Roby was a cashier at a CWI retail store. For months, she experienced sexual-harassment by a store supervisor, Joe Schiavone. Notwithstanding the fairly frequent and offensive behavior, she did not report it. Only after another supervisor overheard a comment she made to a coworker and specifically asked her about it did she report the conduct. The store manager immediately reported it to Human Resources, which conducted an investigation. The company reorganized the store schedule so as to minimize the times Roby and Schiavone worked together. As a result of the investigation, Schiavone received a written warning. Roby was informed of the results of the investigation. Several weeks later, when Roby complained about having to close the store with Schiavone, she was allowed to go home and stay home until the store manager returned from vacation. Although the company told her that they could not accommodate her desire to never be scheduled at the same time as Schiavone, they kept her on the schedule and expected her to come to work. She simply never returned. Instead, she brought an action under Title VII alleging the sexual harassment and also alleging that she was retaliated against for her complaints. The district court granted summary judgment to CWI. Roby appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams and Lawrence affirmed. In order to prevail on a hostile work environment claim, the Court noted that Roby had to demonstrate employer liability. Here, because Schiavone is a supervisor, the company is strictly liable if there was a tangible adverse employment action. If not, however, the company may assert an affirmative defense that they used reasonable care in trying to prevent the harassment and that Roby failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities. The Court found no tangible employment action. The record presented insufficient support for an actual discharge or for the degree of intolerable working conditions necessary to establish a constructive discharge. Although Roby continued to have to work with Schiavone, CWI made an effort to minimize their contact. Without a tangible employment action, the Court found that the company met its burden on the affirmative defense. It conducted an effective investigation and disciplined Schiavone. Roby, on the other hand, failed to report the behavior when it first occurred and did not take advantage of the company’s anti-harassment policy. With respect to Roby's retaliation claim, she must establish the presence of a material adverse employment action. The Court found no such evidence in the record.

Employee's Protest of Supervisor's Conduct for Personal Reasons Does Not Support a Title VII Retaliation Claim

TATE v. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT SERVICES  (October 10, 2008)

Alshafi Tate started working for Executive Management Services (“EMS”) as a commercial building cleaner in August, 2002. Dawn Burban was his immediate supervisor. Tate alleges, and Burban denies, that he and Burban began a long, consensual sexual relationship almost immediately. Tate also alleges, and Burban denies, that when he tried to end the relationship in late 2003, Burban threatened that he would lose his job if he did so. They both agree that they had a heated argument in Burban’s office in January 2004. Tate claims that it occurred when he finally insisted that he was ending the relationship. Burban claims it resulted from Tate’s refusal to perform a proper work assignment. Burban called her supervisor, who told Burban to tell Tate to go home. Burban also called her district manager and reported Tate for insubordination. Tate tried to reach both the supervisor and district manager the next day to relate his side of the story. Instead, he was told he was fired for insubordination. Tate filed suit, alleging both sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The jury found for EMS on the sexual harassment claim and in Tate’s favor on the retaliation claim. The district court denied EMS’ FRCP 50(b) motion on the retaliation claim. EMS appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner, and Williams reversed. The Court laid out the elements of Tate’s Title VII retaliation action: a) a statutorily protected activity, b) the employer’s adverse action, and c) a causal relationship. To show he engaged in protected activity, the Court stated that Tate had to show a reasonable belief that he opposed a practice that violated Title VII. There is a split in the circuits on the issue of whether the rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances could amount to protected activity. The Court decided that it did not have to take a position on the issue. Instead, it found no evidence that Tate actually believed Burban’s conduct was unlawful. The Court recognized that Tate protested Burban’s actions. But it found that the evidence supported the conclusion that his protests were personal, not because he believed that Burban’s behavior was unlawful. Title VII exists to protect employees from retaliation for protesting discrimination they, in good faith, believe they have suffered. Tate does not meet the protected activity element.