Statute Of Frauds Does Not Apply To Illinois Promissory Fraud Claim

BPI ENERGY HOLDINGS v. IEC (MONTGOMERY), LLC (December 8, 2011)

BPI is in the business of producing natural gas from coal. Drummond Company is a large coal mining company. Because companies like BPI need access to coal from which to extract natural gas and companies like Drummond need someone like BPI to extract the gas before it can be safely mine the coal, alliances between companies like these are common. BPI and Drummond entered into a memorandum of understanding pursuant to which the parties agreed that BPI would sell its coal rights to Drummond and Drummond would lease to BPI the extraction rights in its coal holdings. The MOA stated that it was not a binding agreement and merely was intended to form the basis of an agreement. The parties soon entered into a letter of intent that was more specific. It identified BPI's coal interests and Drummond's gas extraction opportunities and further described the alliance expectations of the parties. It also provided, however, that it was not binding upon the parties and it did not provide the terms for the gas extraction leases. Notwithstanding the nonbinding nature of the agreement, BPI began transferring some of its coal rights to Drummond. Drummond did not return the favor and eventually terminated the alliance. BPI brought suit against Drummond for promissory fraud. Chief Judge Herndon (S.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Drummond. BPI appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Posner, Sykes, and Hamilton affirmed. Because there was no contract between the parties, BPI brought its action based on promissory fraud. Although promissory fraud is recognized in Illinois, it is recognized only if it is part of a scheme to defraud. Illinois’ "scheme" requires either a pattern of fraudulent statements or a particularly egregious one. The Court first addressed and rejected Drummond's statute of frauds defense. Although it characterized Illinois' position as "murky," it concluded that Illinois has adopted the majority rule that promissory fraud is a tort and not subject to the Statute of Frauds. Turning to the merits of the fraud claim, the court simply concluded that BPI's evidence was insufficient. The Court also noted that the case would fail for lack of reliance. Both the memorandum and the letter of intent with were nonbinding. Both anticipated that a final, binding agreement would be negotiated. They had not yet even agreed on the terms for the gas extraction leases. Drummond's reliance on these nonbinding agreements was reckless and does not satisfy the justifiable reliance element of fraud.

Under Wisconsin Law, A Contract Can Be Formed By Any Manner Showing Agreement, Including Conduct

REMAPP INTERNATIONAL CORP. v. COMFORT KEYBOARD CO. (March 24, 2009)

ReMapp International Corp. ("ReMapp") and Comfort Keyboard Co. ("Comfort") had done business together for several years. ReMapp provided electronic materials, including circuit boards. In 2006, the parties engaged in oral and written communications regarding the purchase of several thousand circuit boards and several thousand microprocessors. When Comfort did not pay for the material, ReMapp brought a breach of contract action. At a bench trial, the court awarded damages for Comfort's failure to pay for the circuit boards. Although the court also found that Comfort had breached the contract with respect to the microprocessors, the court also found that ReMapp had not mitigated its damages and so awarded no damages. Comfort appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams and Kapala affirmed. The Court cited Wisconsin law for the proposition that contract may be formed in any manner that shows agreement, including the conduct of the parties. The Court determined that the evidence at trial supported the conclusion that the parties had an oral agreement for both the circuit boards and the microprocessors. Because the contract was not in writing and exceeded $500, the Court addressed the Statute of Frauds exceptions relied on below. With respect to the circuit boards, the Court concluded that the evidence supported ReMapp’s argument that they were specially manufactured goods and therefore not subject to the statute. The Court found the issue with respect to the microprocessors moot, because the court below awarded no relief on that issue. Alternatively, it found that the evidence supported the fact that Comfort had received written notice of the order and made no objection within 10 days, therefore taking that contract out of the statute as well.