Telecommunications Act's "In Writing" Requirement Is Satisfied By An Explanation That Allows For Meaningful Review

HELCHER v. DEARBORN COUNTY (February 9, 2010)

Cincinnati Bell Wireless provides wireless services to, among others, the people of Dearborn County, Indiana. In order to improve signal coverage in the area, Cincinnati Bell decided it needed a new cell phone tower. It selected a piece of agriculturally zoned property for the tower and applied for a conditional use permit. The company worked with two consultants to the local Zoning Board in completing its application. The consultants recommended that the granting of the permit, although it was the first time they had recommended the construction of a new tower over the co-location of transmitters onto existing structures. The Board met and heard from the consultants, Bell, and a number of local landowners who opposed the tower. The Board denied the application. At a later meeting, the Board denied Bell's request to reconsider the denial and approved the minutes of the earlier meeting. Bell sued the Board, alleging several violations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Specifically, Bell alleged that the decision was not based on substantial evidence, that the Board minutes did not constitute a sufficient written decision, that the Board unreasonably discriminated against Bell, and that the decision effectively denied wireless services. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Bell appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Rovner, and Wood affirmed. Bell raised the same four arguments. The Court started with the "in writing" requirement of the Telecommunications Act, a question of first impression in the Seventh Circuit. Other circuits' holdings range from allowing a "Denied" stamp on an application to demanding detailed conclusions linked to specific evidence. Noting that the purpose of the requirement is to ensure meaningful judicial review, the Court joined several other circuits in concluding that the requirement is met if there is a sufficient explanation of the Board's reasons to allow a court to evaluate the supporting evidence. Here, the "writing" is the seventeen pages of minutes. The Court concluded that they were sufficient under the Act. They described the issues, the evidence presented by both sides, the concerns of the Board, and the specific Ordinance provisions on which the Board based its denial. On the Court’s review of Bell’s argument that the denial was not supported by substantial evidence, it considered each of the three Ordinance provisions separately. Although the Court found the evidence in support of one of the Ordinance violations thin, it concluded that the other two were supported by substantial evidence. Finally, the Court rejected the “effectively prohibit” and “unreasonably discriminates” arguments. On the former, Bell failed to show that alternatives did not exist. On the latter, Bell presented no evidence of another carrier that was treated more favorably.

Illinois Commerce Commission's Access Order Is Inconsistent With Federal Law

ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE CO. v. BOX  (November 26, 2008)

Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (“Illinois Bell”) is a provider of local telephone service. The Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC”) ordered Illinois Bell to provide certain elements of service, including access to switching centers and splitting, to competing carriers at its cost. Illinois Bell brought suit against the Commission to be relieved of that obligation. The district court granted summary judgment to Illinois Bell. The ICC and intervenor Globalcom, Inc. appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Ripple, and Evans affirmed. The Court first noted the federal interest and approach to the telecommunication industry. Congress and the FCC have established certain requirements to promote competition in the industry. Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Act”) requires carriers like Illinois Bell to provide certain services to other carriers on an unbundled basis and at cost. The FCC determines which services are included, after considering whether access is necessary and whether denial of access would impair the requesting carrier’s ability to provide its service. If the FCC decides a service meets the section 251 criteria, a carrier can request the service from carriers like Illinois Bell at its cost. Section 271 of the Act also entitles carriers to gain access to other unbundled services from “Bell Operating Companies” such as Illinois Bell. Unlike section 251, however, section 271 does not require that access be provided at cost. The FCC allows a carrier to charge a market rate for section 271 services.

The Court found that the ICC’s order that Illinois Bell provide services at cost was inconsistent with Sections 251 and 271. The Court noted that the ICC was, in effect, overruling the FCC. The Court pointed out that the savings clause of section 251 allowed state orders that were consistent with and did not prevent implementation of the section. The Court concluded that the ICC’s orders were inconsistent with and did substantially prevent the implementation of the federal policy. The Act does not specifically forbid the requirement imposed by the ICC but to allow it would defeat the goals of the FCC. The Court concluded that only network services identified by the FCC under section 251 are required to be provided at cost. Other services, even if required to be provided, can be charged at a market price.