Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Commentary : In Their Opinion : Lawyer & Attorney Michael E. Rigney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm

DAKOTA, MINNESOTA & EASTERN RAILROAD CORP. v. WISCONSIN & SOUTHERN RAILROAD CORP. (September 20, 2011)

Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad and Wisconsin & Southern Railroad both operated freight lines in southern Wisconsin. Wisconsin approached Dakota in an effort to purchase some rail line near Janesville, Wisconsin. The line included a 200-foot spur connecting the line with a plant owned by Freedom Plastics. Freedom’s facility was the only plant on the spur. It shipped several carloads a week and was Dakota's largest customer in the area. So Dakota did sell the line to Wisconsin but retained the right to use the line and retained an exclusive easement to serve Freedom over the spur. Years later, Freedom entered receivership. The receiver eventually sold the Janesville plant to North American Pipe Corporation. Wisconsin started shipping for North American, contending that Dakota’s exclusive easement terminated when the plant was sold. Dakota brought suit against Wisconsin, alleging two theories of recovery: 1) breach of contract, on the theory that the exclusive easement was not personal to Freedom but rather referred to the plant itself, and 2) trespass, on the theory that Dakota never sold the tracks, only the land under the tracks. Chief Judge Conley (W.D. Wis.) granted summary judgment to Wisconsin on both claims. Dakota appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Bauer, Posner, and Manion affirmed. With respect to the breach of contract claim, the Court sided with Wisconsin. It rejected Dakota's claim that "trade usage" converted its right to serve Freedom to a right to serve the facility, no matter who owned it. Dakota’s only evidence (a railroad worker’s affidavit) was insufficient to establish trade usage, said the Court. Trade usage requires at least management-level, if not expert, opinion testimony. Then, although it found the contract unambiguous, it considered extrinsic evidence because the parties both relied on it. But the evidence of negotiations did not support Dakota's position. With respect to the trespass claim, the Court noted that the contract of sale excluded the spur tracks but the quitclaim deed did not. Given that inconsistency, the Court stated that the deed controls. Furthermore, the rails are fixtures and sold with the real property to which they are attached. In any event, the Court concluded that the trespass claim was unnecessary. If Dakota had the contract right it claimed, it would prevail on the contract claim without the trespass claim. If it did not have those rights, it could prevail on neither

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MUSCARELLO v. OGLE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (June 24, 2010)

Ogle County, Illinois joined the "green" movement in 2003 by amending its zoning ordinances to allow for the construction of windmills. Baileyville Wind Farms received the first special use permit for 40 windmills in 2005. The county also adopted a plan to protect residential, but not non-residential, property owners in the event of any diminution of property value. Patricia Muscarello owns nonresidential property adjacent to the proposed windfarm and has opposed its siting from the beginning. Unsuccessful in her attempts to block the project locally, Muscarello brought suit. She brought constitutional claims (unlawful taking, due process, equal protection), common law claims (trespass, nuisance), and state law claims (declaratory judgment, administrative review, writ of certiorari, unlawful taking, due process, equal protection, injunctive relief). She named over forty defendants, including Ogle County and related entities and individuals, the parties to the administrative proceedings, and Baileyville and its corporate parents. Judge Kapala (N.D. Ill) dismissed all the federal and common law claims as either unripe or for failure to state a claim. He then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. He also denied a request by Baileyville to stay administrative proceedings regarding the expiration of the special use permit. Both parties appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Wood, and Williams affirmed. The Court first addressed the three federal constitutional claims. The takings claim alleged no physical taking but relied on the “regulatory taking” concept. Under that concept, the permit must render her land useless for her to prevail. That is not the case here. Alternatively, the Court noted that Muscarello’s takings claim fails also because she failed to exhaust available state remedies. The Court rejected her equal protection claim that addressed the differential treatment afforded to residential and nonresidential landowners. Not only was it also unripe because of her failure to exhaust, the Court concluded that it would meet the deferential "rational basis" test. With respect to the due process claim, the Court concluded that Muscarello had no protectable property interest in the lifting of restrictions on adjacent property. The Court next addressed the state common-law claims, for which Muscarello asserted diversity jurisdiction. The district court never resolved the jurisdictional question, dismissing instead on ripeness grounds. On appeal, the Court considered both issues. The Court applied its citizenship analysis and concluded that Muscarello established diversity jurisdiction. On the merits, however, the Court agreed with the district court that Illinois law requires an invasion for both a trespass and nuisance. Since the windmills have not yet been built, there is no invasion -- and no trespass or nuisance. Finally, the Court considered the several state claims for which Muscarello asserted supplemental jurisdiction. It found no abuse of discretion for the dismissal of those claims. However, since it had just established that diversity jurisdiction did exist, it questioned whether the district court should have kept these claims under diversity jurisdiction. Although a plaintiff has the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction, a district court should rarely dismiss when jurisdiction in fact exists but was improperly pleaded. Here, the plaintiff had been given several opportunities to properly plead jurisdiction -- and she failed to do so. The Court decided not to do it for her. Finally, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Baileyville’s requested stay.

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