Plaintiff Has Burden Of Proof On Exigent Circumstances Defense To Warrantless Search Claim

BOGAN v. CITY OF CHICAGO (July 6, 2011)

Nicole Evans's eight-year-old son called 911 at about 2:30 a.m. to report that his mother was being beaten. When officers arrived at her apartment, a male voice swore at them from inside. They then heard a woman scream and eventually found her on the roof. She was partially dressed, mentally distraught, and physically injured. She told the police that she wanted her boyfriend arrested. The police saw the boyfriend through an apartment window and went after him. He ran to the rear of the apartment and they followed, searching every room. Other officers had arrived at the building and advised that an African-American male was on the rear porch. The officers arrived at a door which they assumed was a door to the porch. They tried to kick it in but Sharon Bogan opened the door from the inside. She identified the boyfriend as her son. Chicago police searched the apartment but did not find boyfriend. Bogan brought suit against the City of Chicago and the officers under § 1983. She alleged a Fourth Amendment violation. A jury returned a verdict for the defendants. Judge Kennelly (N.D. Ill.) denied her motion for judgment as a matter of law. Bogan appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Ripple and Hamilton and District Judge Murphy affirmed. The Court first addressed Bogan's claim that the exigent circumstances instruction was error. The district court instructed the jury that Bogan had to prove that a reasonable officer would not have believed that a crime suspect was in the apartment. The Court noted that it had never addressed that precise question. It had, however, addressed the burden of proof question with respect to consent. In Valance, the Court concluded that a defendant asserting a consent exception to a warrantless search claim has the burden of coming forward with evidence but the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of persuasion. The Court concluded that its rationale there also applied to the exigent circumstances exception as well. The Court acknowledged that there is a split in the circuits on the question, but countered that the split has existed for some time. The Court next addressed Bogan's argument that it was error to allow one of the officers to testify regarding his subjective beliefs during the search of Evans’s apartment. The Court recognized that the exigent circumstances exception cannot be satisfied with a police officer’s subjective view. Instead, the factfinder views the totality of the circumstances as they would have appeared to a reasonable person in the officer’s position. Here, the officer's testimony simply explained his progress and decisions made during this search. The information could have been helpful to a jury in assessing the reasonableness of his actions. Finally, the Court found no error in the district court's rejection of Bogan's request for judgment as a matter of law. There was sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that the officers reasonably believed the boyfriend was in the apartment.

Town's Regulation Of Firearms Is Consistent With Heller

JUSTICE v. TOWN OF CICERO (August 14, 2009)

On the basis of an affidavit of a local building inspector asserting that John Justice was operating a business without a license and was likely illegally storing chemicals, a state judge issued a search warrant. During the search, the police discovered several unregistered guns. The town seized the guns and ticketed Justice for their possession. Justice responded with a lawsuit against the town and several individuals. Justice alleged a lack of probable cause for the search and challenged both the business license and firearm ordinance. He also asserted various antitrust claims arising out of the town's water supply charges. The district court dismissed the entire complaint for a failure to state a claim. Justice appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Wood and Tinder affirmed. The Court took each of Justice's allegations in turn. With respect to his challenge of the business license ordinance, the Court noted that the town was a home-rule unit with the power to regulate and license. The Court agreed with the district court that the ordinance was a proper application of that power. The Court next rejected Justice's challenge to the search. The search was conducted pursuant to a properly issued warrant. With respect to the firearm ordinance, the Court noted the Supreme Court's recent decision in Heller, which struck down a District of Columbia handgun prohibition, and the Court's even more recent decision in City of Chicago, which concluded that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states. Justice has no case either because City of Chicago was decided correctly and the Second Amendment does not apply to the town, or, even if the Second Amendment does apply, the ordinance is consistent with Heller in that it only regulates – and does not prohibit - gun possession. Finally, the Court summarily affirmed the district court with respect to Justice's various claims with respect to the town's water supply practices. Water supply is a traditional government activity authorized by state law. The town is immune from both federal and state antitrust liability for its water supply activities.

 

A Section 1983 Claim Of Unlawful Search Borrows Its Survivability From The State False Imprisonment Tort, Not Trespass

BENTZ v. CITY OF KENDALLVILLE (August 14, 2009)

The local police arrived at the home of Dr. Bernard Leonelli, responding to reports of a domestic dispute. An officer observed a large fire on the front lawn and was told by bystanders that a fight was taking place inside the home. The officer approached Leonelli, who was standing on his front porch, and asked to speak with him. Instead, Leonelli walked into the house, where the officer observed him reaching for something. The officer entered the house, arrested Leonelli and searched the premises for a possible victim of domestic abuse. Leonelli brought an action against the city under § 1983, alleging that both the arrest and the search were unreasonable and unlawful. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Leonelli appealed -- but died before the appeal was heard. His personal representative seeks to continue the appeal on his behalf.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Posner and Kanne granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal. Section 1983 is silent on whether a claim survives death. Instead, the Court stated, the state’s survival statute applies. A court must first characterize the § 1983 claim and decide which state tort is most analogous. With respect to the arrest claim, the Court noted that the plaintiff had to establish the fact of a seizure and its unreasonableness. The Court concluded that the closest Indiana tort was false imprisonment, the elements of which are almost identical to those for false arrest. Since an Indiana tort of false imprisonment does not survive the death of the plaintiff, neither does Leonelli's false arrest claim. With respect to the unlawful entry and search, the Court stated that the facts of the case were closely analogous to both a state trespass claim, which does survive, and a state invasion of privacy claim, which does not survive. The proper analysis, however, focuses on the elements of the federal claim, not the specific facts of the case. Looking at it from that perspective, the Court concluded that an expectation of privacy is the core of the unreasonable search claim. The federal claim is more analogous to invasion of privacy than it is to trespass. The claim does not survive.

A Valid Warrant To Search A Single-Family Residence Does Not Support The Continued Execution Of The Search Once The Officers Are Aware That The Building Is A Multiple-Unit Building

GUZMAN v. CITY OF CHICAGO (May 13, 2009)

Sgt. Bonnstetter of the Chicago Police Department met with an ex-convict who wanted to share information regarding gang activity with the police. The informant provided valuable information and identified pictures of known gang members. He specifically advised Sergeant Bonnstetter that he was aware of the location of gang member Ruben Estrada. He told Bonnstetter that Estrada lived with his family in a single-family residence at an address on the west side of Chicago. He advised that he had seen Estrada at the residence with a handgun. He even drove by the house with an FBI agent and confirmed the location. Although there was a small sign in the front window, the agent assumed that it was a single family residence. Based on this information, Bonnstetter obtain an affidavit to search the premises and Estrada's person. When the officers arrived to execute the search warrant, they realized there was a separate door leading to a business and another door leading to a stairway to the second floor. At some point, it became clear that the building contained a first floor office, a first floor apartment, and a second floor apartment. The officers broke into the second-floor apartment and encountered Maira Guzman. With guns drawn, the officers searched the apartment -- but found nothing. Guzman brought a lawsuit against the City and several officers under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging that the search was unreasonable and a violation of her constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. Guzman appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Rovner and Evans reversed and remanded. The Court identified the two different ways of evaluating an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment. A court must look at both the issuance of a warrant and the execution of the warrant. Here, with respect to its issuance, the Court determined that there was sufficient indicia of reliability with respect to the informant to support probable cause. The informant provided information known to the police and identified a number of known gang members. With respect to the execution of the warrant, however, the Court disagreed with the district court. The Court specifically noted the "not uncommon" problems that arise with multiple living units. In executing the warrant in this case, the Court concluded that the officers were aware early in their search that the building was not a single-family residence, as expected and as described in the warrant. The proper course at that stage was to have called off the search. By continuing the execution of the warrant, the police violated Guzman's constitutional rights.

Judge Rovner wrote separately and concurred in the holding and reasoning. She did not join in that part of Judge Evans’ opinion in which, in dicta, he discussed Fourth Amendment rights in the context of civil actions as opposed to criminal suppression motions.