Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Commentary : In Their Opinion : Lawyer & Attorney Michael E. Rigney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm

GROSS v. PPG INDUSTRIES (March 7, 2011)

PPG Industries has employed Eric Gross as an industrial technician since 1997. Gross is a member of the United States Marine Corps Reserve. He was called up for active duty in 2004. Before he left, he met with the PPG's human resources advisor, who explained his benefits. PPG’s policy guaranteed his return to his job and also paid him the differential between his PPG salary and his military salary. PPG computed the salary differential by subtracting his military monthly base pay from his PPG monthly base pay. When Gross returned from deployment, he submitted a complaint regarding the differential calculation. Since Gross was required to work more days per month in the military, he wanted PPG to: a) calculate a daily rate of pay for his military job, and b) subtract from his PPG salary his military salary for only those days he would have worked at PPG. PPG refused to apply that calculation retroactively, but did adopt it prospectively. Gross brought suit against PPG pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act. Judge Stadtmueller (E.D. Wis.) granted PPG summary judgment. Gross appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Rovner, and Evans affirmed. The Court first addressed Gross' argument that the pay calculation violated the Act. Under § 4311, someone in Gross' position cannot be denied a "benefit of employment" because of his service obligations. The Court noted that it has very recently held (opinion and intheiropinion) that § 4311 does not require an employer to provide benefits to military personnel that it does not offer to other employees. Section 4311's purpose is to protect military personnel from discrimination, not to provide preferential treatment. The Court added that Gross would not be entitled to relief even if it accepted his argument that differential pay was a "benefit of employment." PPG did not deny Gross his differential pay. It just did not pay it under Gross' calculations -- nor was it required to. Next, the Court considered and rejected Gross’ retaliation claim. The Act only prohibits an adverse employment action against a person who has sought protection under the Act. Here, there was no adverse employment action. PPG paid Gross under a calculation that it was within its rights to use and denied him no pay. Even if the calculation constituted an adverse employment action, it could not amount to retaliation. All of the calculations and payments under the PPG formula took place before Gross made any complaints. They could not possibly been in retaliation for something that had not yet occurred.

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MIDDLETON v. CITY OF CHICAGO (August 24, 2009)

From 1960 until 1989, Charles Middleton served in the Air Force. On two occasions in the early 1990s, he applied for positions with the City of Chicago. He was not hired for either position. In 2007, Middleton sued the City pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). He alleged that the City refused to employ him on account of his military service. The district court applied the four year "catch-all" statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (a) and dismissed his complaint. Middleton appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Rovner and Wood affirmed. The Court considered not only the application of § 1658 (a) to the claim but also the provisions of the Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act (VBIA), enacted after the appeal. Section 1658 was enacted in 1990. Its purpose, said the Court, was to minimize the borrowing of state statutes of limitations for federal causes of action. It provided a four-year statute of limitations for any federal claim brought under a later-enacted statute, if the statute had no expressed limitations period. USERRA was enacted four years later and contained no expressed statute of limitations. The Court concluded, based on the plain meaning of the statute, that the four-year limitations applied. In doing so, it rejected the Middleton's arguments that: 1) the section did not apply because USERRA was simply an amendment of an earlier-enacted statute, and 2) the legislative history indicated Congress' intent that no statute of limitations apply. The Court turned its attention to the VBIA. The VBIA eliminates any limitations period for a USERRA cause of action. The Court noted the "well-established" rule that a statute should not be applied retroactively unless Congress' intent is clear. Nothing in the statute addresses retroactivity. The Court concluded that the statute should not be given retroactive effect. Finally, the court rejected Middleton's argument that the VBIA was merely a clarification of existing law.

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CREWS v. CITY OF MT. VERNON (June 2, 2009)
 

Ryan Crews is a member both of the Mount Vernon Police Department and the Army National Guard and has been so for years. His work obligations to the department and the military frequently conflict. Since 1997, however, the department has allowed Crews to adjust his work schedule by moving any weekend department shifts that conflict with his guard exercises to the regular workweek. Thus, Crews was paid for a full week's work without using vacation or other time-off. Between 2000 and 2003, the department offered the same arrangement to three additional guard members hired as police officers. Non-guard members had no comparable opportunities to reschedule workdays. When the department hired two more guard members in 2006, the department rescinded the policy. The additional guard members in the department made implementation of the policy too costly. Crews brought an action against the City under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment ct ("USERRA"), alleging that the rescission of the policy denied him a benefit of employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, ruling that § 4316(b) did not require the City to provide scheduling benefits not generally available to members of the department not in the National Guard. Crews appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court noted that USERRA contains a general anti-discrimination provision in § 4311 as well as the § 4316 requirement that service members who are on leave to fulfill their obligations are entitled to benefits generally afforded other employees on similar leave. Addressing § 4316, the Court held that Crews was entitled only to equal treatment, not to the preferential treatment the policy afforded. The Court further held, however, that § 4311 could also apply. The Court found some basis for Crews' claim in the statute's "any benefit of employment" language. It concluded, however, that the better interpretation of the statute is that a "benefit of employment" is one afforded military and non-military employees alike. Thus, Crews could not prevail under § 4311, either.

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MADDEN v. ROLLS ROYCE CORP. (April 29, 2009)

Rick Madden, a member of the U.S. Air Force Reserve, was hired as a temporary employee at Rolls-Royce Corporation. He represented, falsely, that he was a graduate of Purdue's engineering program. He did not impress his supervisor with his skills. At the end of the temporary period for which she had been hired, Rolls-Royce let him go. He then applied for a job with Data Systems and Solutions (DS&S), without success. Madden brought suit against Rolls-Royce and DS&S, alleging that both violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) by discriminating against him on the basis of his military service. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Madden appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner and Rovner affirmed. Even if a plaintiff under USERRA establishes that his military service was a motivating factor in his discharge or failure to be hired, the defendant is given the opportunity, and the burden, to show that its actions would have been taken even in the absence of military obligations. Here, the defendants’ evidence is compelling and barely contested. Madden’s performance at Rolls-Royce was unsatisfactory. The company was not going to retain him when it had to lay off someone and his co-worker was a better performer. With respect to DS&S, the Court concluded that the company surely would have checked his record and his resume before offering him a job. His poor performance at Rolls-Royce and his resume fraud would justify its refusal to hire.

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SANDOVAL v. CITY OF CHICAGO (March 30, 2009)

Juan Sandoval and Sidney Pennix were Chicago police officers. They were also in the military reserve and on active duty in El Salvador and Iraq, respectively. When Chicago scheduled the examination for candidates for sergeant, Sandoval and Pennix requested an opportunity sit for the test. Chicago accommodated their requests by offering them the opportunity to take the test in, respectively, San Salvador and Frankfurt. They both took the test, passed and were placed on the eligibility list. They then filed suit pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). They both allege that they should have been offered locations closer to where they were stationed and also seek compensation for the transportation cost to the testing locations. The district court granted summary judgment to the City of Chicago. Sandoval and Pennix appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Kanne and Evans affirmed. The Court focused on the language of USERRA. It provides that a person serving in the military may not be denied a benefit of employment because of that service. In other words, said the Court, the Act requires an employer to treat persons on active duty the same as other employees. Here, Sandoval and Pennix seek an accommodation - not equal treatment. Chicago treated Sandoval and Pennix the same as it would have treated any other employee who was on leave for a non-military reason. The City did not violate USERRA.

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STAUB v. PROCTOR HOSPITAL (March 25, 2009)

Vincent Staub was a technologist at Proctor Hospital - and also a member of the Army reserves. Although he managed to balance the two obligations for years, things began to deteriorate in 2000. One of his supervisors was clearly irritated with him because of his reserve obligations. She was very vocal about her dislike of the reserve and her desire to “ get rid of him." Staub, unfortunately, already had a checkered employment history at the hospital. In January 2004, she gave Staub a written warning. She accused him of failing to assist other members of the hospital staff and of leaving his work area. As a result, Staub was instructed to keep his supervisors advised of his whereabouts and schedule at all times. A few months later, a similar incident occurred. Staub was fired immediately by the Vice President of Human Resources. She fired Staub for not only failing to follow the earlier warning, but also for his past issues. Although Staub filed a grievance insisting that the original incident was fabricated by his colleague who did not like him, the HR VP did not investigate. Staub filed an action against the hospital under the Uniformed Services Employment and the Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The jury found for Staub and awarded damages. The district court denied Proctor’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Proctor appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans and Tinder reversed and remanded. The Court stated that USERRA prohibits adverse action based on military status. In order to recover, however, a plaintiff must show that the decision-maker, and not just any coworker, harbored the animus. Here, the HR VP was the decision-maker. There is no evidence in the record that she harbored any animosity against Staub or his military responsibilities. Realizing this, Staub relies on the “cat's paw” theory. Under this approach, the discriminatory animus of a non-decisionmaker is imputed to a decisionmaker when the non-decisionmaker exerts singular influence over the decisionmaker to cause the adverse employment action. The Court emphasized that the employer is not liable unless the decisionmaker relies exclusively on the information provided and fails to conduct any investigation. Here, the Court found that the evidence did not support that conclusion. The evidence was clear that the decisionmaker did not rely exclusively on any information provided by other employees. In fact, the Court criticized the district court for even sending the issue to the jury. Instead, the Court suggested an approach whereby the trial judge makes a threshold determination on whether a reasonable jury could find this exclusive influence before even admitting into evidence the animus of a non-decisionmaker.

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MAHER v. CITY OF CHICAGO (October 31, 2008)

Jerome Maher, a Naval Reservist, went to work for the City of Chicago in 1990. Although he alleges that he was promised an “assistant commissioner” position, his initial position involved managing accounts receivable and developing a computer system in the Aviation Department. In February of 1991, Maher was called to active duty. He alleges that his supervisor was displeased. Upon Maher’s return in September of the same year, he was named “Director of Revenue” at an increased salary. He alleges that his supervisor continued to criticize and threaten his employment because of his military obligations. He also was forced to report to a former subordinate. Maher filed, but later withdrew, a formal complaint with the Department of Labor. He alleged that he had been denied advancement and subjected to humiliation because of his military service. After an internal reorganization in 1993, Maher was named “Manager of Finance.” He received another salary increase and a larger staff. Maher alleged that his office was unusable for a week and that other supervisors harassed and were critical of him and his service. The Navy again called Maher to active duty from August 1996 to May of 1997. The City initially refused to assign Maher to his former duties upon his return. Following complaints and meetings, Maher was given his former responsibilities in July of 1997, although two former staff members were reassigned to work for his supervisor. In January, 1998, the City transferred Maher to its Landside Operations, a division of the Aviation Department that handles ground transportation at the city’s airports. In this position, Maher developed a high-speed rail system and an intermodal facility, operated the parking facilities, and supervised snow removal. Maher sued the City in 2003. He alleged that he suffered adverse employment consequences as a result of his military service on three separate occasions: a) when the City did not give him an assistant commissioner title in 1991, b) when the City named him Manager of Finance in 1993 but again did not give him an assistant commissioner title, and c) when the City transferred him to the Landside Division in 1998. He alleged a violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). The magistrate judge granted summary judgment to the City on the 1991 and 1993 claims, concluding that Maher produced no evidence that he was hired as an assistant commissioner and produced insufficient evidence that the City’s actions were motivated solely by his military commitment. The magistrate also ruled that laches barred the 1991 action. Maher’s 1998 claim went to trial. The magistrate ruled that evidence of the 1991 and 1993 claims could not be presented at that trial. After one hung jury, a second jury found for the City. Maher appeals: a) the summary judgment on the 1991 claim, b) the exclusion of evidence of the 1991 and 1993 claim from the jury, and c) the jury verdict on the 1998 claim.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Wood, and Williams affirmed. On the 1991 claim, the Court noted that Maher challenged only the magistrate’s laches ruling. He did not challenge the magistrate’s alternative holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When a lower court provides more than one independent ground for a holding, the appellant’s failure to challenge one of them is a waiver of any claim of error with respect to the entire holding. Notwithstanding the Court’s finding of a waiver, it did also address the laches argument on the merits. The Court agreed with the magistrate. Laches requires an unreasonable lack of diligence and prejudice. Maher points to both his Department of Labor complaint and his internal complaints as evidence of his due diligence. The Court noted that the Department of Labor complaint was withdrawn eleven years before the suit was filed. One informal complaint was made five years into that eleven year period. The Court found that the two complaints did not amount to reasonable diligence. The Court also found prejudice to the City. The person who hired Maher testified that he had very little recollection of the circumstances of Maher's hiring.

The Court next addressed the magistrate’s exclusion of the evidence of the 1991 and 1993 incidents at the second trial of the 1998 incident. The Court found that the magistrate did not abuse his discretion. Neither incident was relevant to any alleged adverse employment action in 1998 and both took place before the 1998 decision-maker was in charge.

Finally, Maher challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at the 1998 trial. The Court concluded that Maher’s challenge was procedurally defective. Maher did not file either a FRCP 50(a) or 50(b) motion, both of which are required before challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Maher conceded as much at oral argument. Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to analyze his argument under the “heavy burden” of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. Under the USERRA, Maher must establish that he suffered an adverse employment action motivated at least in part by his military service. The Court found against Maher on both points. Maher relied on the facts that he lacked a staff, was not using his CPA qualifications, had a supervisor with less college education, and was responsible for snow removal. The Court held that none of these establish the existence of an adverse employment action. In his new position, he was responsible for large-scale projects involving hundreds of millions of dollars and handled millions of dollars of billing. An adverse employment action must be more disruptive than just a change in responsibilities. Maher also did not establish that a reasonable juror must have found that hostility toward his service was the reason for his transfer. Maher relied on the promotions of others ahead of him, but the person who transferred Maher to Landside was not the same person who promoted the others. When different decision –makers are involved, said the Court, one should not conclude that the difference in their actions was the result of discrimination. The jury had the opportunity to make the inferences that Maher argued – but it didn’t. They were not required to on the record in the case.

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