Preventing The Creation Of Evidence Does Not Amount To Spoliation

DURAN v. TOWN OF CICERO (August 9, 2011)

Alejandro and Maria Duran threw a party at their Cicero, Illinois home to celebrate their daughter’s baptism. Close to 100 people attended. The Cicero police received two telephone complaints from neighbors. Shortly after the Cicero police responded to the second complaint, the party guests and the police exchanged heated words. Once the police actually entered the property, ostensibly to make an arrest, the verbal melee became a physical one. Seventy-eight guests claim they were physically injured and several police officers required medical treatment. The police made seven arrests but there were no convictions. The 78 injured guests brought suit against 17 police officers and the Town of Cicero pursuant to § 1983 and Illinois law. They also asserted a spoliation of evidence claim based on the police's confiscation of two video cameras, one that was returned but that did not contain any footage of the physical confrontation and one that was not returned that did contain footage of the confrontation. Before trial, Cicero stipulated to his liability under § 1983 and to its vicarious liability on the state law claims. The jury returned verdicts in favor of 23 plaintiffs, on which the court entered judgment. The court then tried to spoliation case. It excluded from that case the issue of the returned video camera, rejecting plaintiffs' theory that preventing the creation of evidence amounts to spoliation. Cicero filed a Rule 59 motion to amend the judgments pursuant because they appeared to list separate awards against both the individual defendants and Cicero for the same injuries. Judge Grady (N.D. Ill.) denied the motion. Cicero appeals the denial of the Rule 59 motion. The plaintiffs cross-appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Ripple, Manion, and Sykes vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part. The Court first addressed Cicero's appeal. It noted the fundamental principle that a plaintiff is only entitled to one recovery for his injuries. Here, Cicero had stipulated to its liability and that issue should not have been submitted to the jury. It was -- and they were obviously confused. In addition, instructions and special verdict forms asked damages to be assessed by defendant or by claim and not for a particular injury to a particular plaintiff. A Rule 59(e) motion is a proper way to correct a manifest error of law such as this. The Court concluded that it was reasonably clear what the jury was trying to do and remanded for an amended judgment to eliminate any possibility of double recovery. The plaintiffs raise three issues on appeal: the exclusion of the videotape, the exclusion of misconduct complaints against one defendant, and the exclusion of a civil rights conviction against another defendant. First, the Court agreed with the district court that the evidence regarding the returned video camera was properly excluded. Spoliation occurs only when one fails to preserve existing evidence. Here, plaintiffs argue that the videographer would have continued recording the physical melee, creating valuable evidence for trial. That does not amount to actionable spoliation in Illinois. Second, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding four misconduct complaints accusing one of the defendants of verbally abusing minorities. The Court noted the substantial leeway a district court has in ruling on an issue like this that requires a balancing of the evidence’s probative value with its prejudicial effect. Third, the plaintiffs sought to introduce a criminal conviction on a civil rights charge against another officer. They argued admissibility under either Rule 609(a)(1) or 609(a)(2). The Court concluded that plaintiffs forfeited their (a)(1) argument because they did not renew it at trial after the court's conditional pretrial ruling excluding it. With respect to (a)(2), the Court concluded that, although there was some evidence of an attempted cover-up, the crime with which the officer was charged and convicted did not involve dishonesty.

Three Judges Would Grant Rehearing En Banc To Address Damages Issues

THOMAS v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (May 3, 2010)

In their opinion of December 1, 2009, Judges Flaum, Wood, and Williams affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part a $4.45 million jury verdict awarded to the mother of a young man who died while in custody of the Cook County Jail (refer to the panel opinion and to my post). Cook County and the individual defendants petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc. With respect to the petition of the individual defendants, the panel unanimously voted to deny rehearing and no judge in regular active service requested a vote on the petition en banc. With respect to the petition of the County, however, three judges voted to grant the rehearing en banc with respect to the issue of damages. In consideration of the petition and the votes to grant the rehearing, the panel amended its opinion.

In their amended opinion, Judges Flaum, Wood, and Williams refined their analysis of the damages issue and provided some general prophylactic guidance regarding verdict forms. The panel reaffirmed its original decision upholding the verdict, notwithstanding the confusion apparent in the instructions and the verdict form.

Judge Sykes, joined by Judges Posner and Tinder, dissented from the denial of the County's petition for rehearing en banc. The principal claims in the case sought compensation for a single injury -- Norman Smith's suffering and death while in the custody of the Cook County Jail. Because liability is joint and several, the jury should not have been asked to assess damages by claim or by defendant. The dissent criticizes the panel for approving the district court's discretion to choose between the "ceiling" and the "cumulative" approaches to the confusion verdict. In the dissent's view, neither approach is supported by the Circuit's precedent. Finally, Judge Sykes is critical of the panel's reliance on the general proposition and presumption that jurors follow their instructions. Given the "bewildering hodgepodge" of instructions and the backwards verdict form, the Court cannot have any confidence that the jury acted properly. Judge Sykes would have granted the petition to address the treatment of the damage award.

Separate Claims By Two Plaintiffs Require Submission Of A Verdict Form With Separate Lines For Damage Awards

HAPPEL v. WALMART STORES (April 19, 2010)

Heidi Happel was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in the early 1990s. In 1993, her primary care physician prescribed a pain reliever for an unrelated condition. In fact, she was allergic to the medication. Her physician phoned the prescription to a Walmart pharmacy were Happel typically filled her prescriptions. Despite the fact that Walmart's computer system and Happel's husband both alerted the pharmacist to her allergy, he filled the prescription anyway. Happel immediately went into anaphylactic shock. Her general health quickly deteriorated. She and her husband sued Walmart -- Happel brought a negligence claim and her husband brought a loss of society claim. The Happels listed the original diagnosing physician as a witness but did not disclose him as an expert or tender an expert report. They did list a neurologist as their expert. Just before trial, the Happels attempted to add the diagnosing physician as an expert. The district court denied their request. The court also excluded much of the neurologist’s testimony. In its instructions, the court included the loss of society claim within the negligence claim. It then submitted to the jury a verdict form that contained only a single line for an award of damages. The jury awarded $465,400. The court reduced the award by $150,000 because of a settlement before trial with the primary care physician. The Happels appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams, and Sykes reversed and remanded. The Court first addressed the expert issues. With respect to the diagnosing physician, the Court noted that the Happels only addressed his qualifications – but that was not the basis for the lower court's exclusion. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's excluding the diagnosing physician as an expert when plaintiffs failed to disclose him as such during discovery. With respect to the neurologist, the district court excluded his testimony regarding Happel's multiple sclerosis because he had very little experience with multiple sclerosis. The Court found no abuse of discretion. With respect to the damages verdict, the Court noted that the lower court treated the loss of society claim as simply one aspect of the overarching negligence claim. Although the court instructed the jury to return separate verdicts for each of the plaintiffs, the verdict form it provided had only a single line for a damages award. The Court concluded that the jury instructions and the form of verdict were ambiguous. As a result, it is impossible to determine Although it was error to give the instruction and use the form, the Court noted that it still had to find prejudice before granting a new trial. It found prejudice in reference to the set-off amounts. Each individual plaintiff had settled with the primary care physician for $75,000 each. If the jury intended to award each of the plaintiffs more than $75,000, the $150,000 ($75,000 from each) set off is correct. However, if the jury's intent was to award either plaintiff less than $75,000, that plaintiff's set-off would be capped at the amount of the award and the total set-off would then be less than $150,000. Having found prejudice, the court reversed for new trial on damages.

Monell Requires Causal Link Between Unconstitutional Act and Harm

THOMAS v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (December 1, 2009)

Norman Smith was arrested by the Chicago police on April 23, 2004. He was delivered to the Cook County Jail on April 24, where he was scheduled to remain until his trial date. An intake medical examination showed elevated blood pressure but no other medical problems. Smith showed symptoms of something more serious, however, from that first day. He was dizzy and vomiting. His symptoms became more serious over the next several days. Despite repeated requests by Smith and by other detainees on his behalf for medical assistance, he received none. On April 30, his cellmate discovered Smith convulsing on the floor. The cellmate reported it immediately to the officer on duty. There was a significant delay before Smith received any treatment. He died that morning of pneumococcal meningitis. His mother, Marlita Thomas, brought a § 1983 case against a number of individual correctional officers, the Cook County Sheriff and Cook County. A jury awarded Thomas $4,450,000 against the County, the Sheriff and three correctional officers. The jury then allocated the damages amongst the defendants. The court denied the defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. The defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Wood and Williams affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The Court first addressed the verdict against the individual officers. In order to prevail, the Court stated that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a medical condition is objectively serious, that the defendant has subjective knowledge of the health risk and the defendant disregarded the risk. The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to allow a jury to conclude that the individual officers knew about Smith's health risk and ignored it. Thus, the verdict is affirmed. The Court next addressed the verdict against the County. The County can be liable only if the unconstitutional act is the result of an official policy or a widespread practice or custom or is caused by an official with policy-making authority. The Court refused to adopt a bright-line test on how widespread a policy need be, but noted that it must be more than a random event. The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of a widespread policy: a failure to review medical requests, a failure to collect medical requests, keeping request forms in a locked box, etc. Thus, the verdict against the County was affirmed. The Court next addressed the verdict against the Sheriff. The basis for imposing liability under Monell against the Sheriff was his policy of severely understaffing the jail. In order to sustain the verdict, there must be a causal link between the policy and the unconstitutional act. Here, the individual officers were found liable based on their deliberate indifference to Smith's medical needs. The Court found no relationship between the officers' conduct and the understaffing. The Court concluded that the understaffing theory was too remote to support the verdict. Thus, the Court reversed for entry of judgment in the Sheriff's favor. After rejecting several evidentiary arguments of the defendants, the Court addressed the verdict. On the verdict form, the jury entered $150,000 against the officers, $3 million against the County, and $1 million against the Sheriff. This allocation was improper, in that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for one indivisible injury. It raised the question of whether the total damages is the sum of all of the damage awards, or the highest single assessment. The Court presumed that the jury followed instructions to not award duplicate damages and concluded that adding the damage awards would be proper. Under that analysis, the award against the Sheriff ($1 million) remains as part of the verdict against the County and individual officers, notwithstanding the reversal of the verdict against the Sheriff. Finally, the Court rejected the defendants' argument that the award was excessive.