Whistle-Blower's Inability To Demonstrate Both Objective and Subjective Belief That Supervisor Acted Unlawfully Defeats Her Retaliation Claim
HARP v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (March 16, 2009)
Mary Harp was a supervisor in the audit department at Charter Communications, Inc. ("Charter"). She was responsible for ensuring that Charter’s outside contractors performed the services for which they were retained. In early 2004, she concluded that one of Charter’s outside contractors sought payment for services it did not perform. Harp was unhappy with the way Charter treated the situation. She complained to the company that her direct supervisor violated the company's ethics code by authorizing full payment to the contractor. Shortly thereafter, the entire audit department was eliminated as part of a reduction in force. Harp brought an action against Charter under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, alleging that her termination was in retaliation for her whistle-blowing. The district court granted summary judgment to Charter. Harp appeals.
In their opinion, Judges Ripple and Rovner affirmed (Tinder dissenting). In order to prevail, the Court noted that Harp had to prove a) that she engaged in protected activity, b) that Charter knew she was engaged in protected activity, c) that she suffered an unfavorable personnel action, and d) that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action. In order to meet the “protected activity” element, Harp must have actually believed that her supervisor’s conduct was unlawful and her belief must have been reasonable. The Court concluded that Harp's allegation that her supervisor authorized full payment to a contractor for services not performed had no subjective or objective basis for belief. The Court noted that Harp relied on conversations with a coworker in coming to her conclusion and that her own conduct was inconsistent with the belief. Thus, Harp was unable to establish even the first element of the test. The Court added that her claim would fail even if she met that element. The fact that the entire department was eliminated as part of a reduction in force would prevent her from establishing that her complaint was a contributing factor in her termination.
Judge Tinder dissented. Judge Tinder agreed with the legal test laid out in the majority opinion but disagreed with the majority's analysis and application of the facts to the law. He believed that Harp had a subjective belief that the company was a victim of fraud at the time she submitted her complaint and that her complaint could be reconciled with her deposition testimony. He also thought the circumstances behind the reduction in force were questionable enough to allow Harp to proceed with her complaint. For example, Charter argued that the reduction in force was necessary to save $800,000 a month -- yet the salaries of the entire department amounted to less than $200,000 per month. Also, Harp's severance form indicated that she would not be eligible for rehire -- a fact Judge Tinder thought atypical of a reduction in force. Finally, Charter began rehiring for the audit department within two months of the reduction. Judge Tinder thought that Harp had presented enough evidence to allow her claim to go to the jury.
Donald Bregin was employed as an accounts receivable collector for 